Terran Republic Air Cav (TRAC)

Security and Control:

3-7. General.

Operational security (OPSEC) is the protection of military operations and activities from enemy exploitation. It includes those actions taken to deny the enemy information about planned, ongoing, and completed operations. Effective OPSEC helps maintain surprise in air assault operations and is a tactical imperative because of the density of helicopters involved, the reliance on radio communications, and the potential for catastrophic losses if plans and operations are compromised. An air assault task force makes a lucrative target for enemy air defense, air, and artillery systems. Every reasonable effort must be made to avoid disclosing intended locations and time(s) of air assault operations and thus losing the element of surprise. A "telegraphed punch" can be catastrophic to air assault operations.

3-8. Countermeasures.

The AATF is vulnerable to enemy intelligence gathering methods and must counter the Threat with OPSEC measures including:

a. Signal security. This includes:

(1) Radio listening silence when possible.

(2) Use of low power transmission,

(3) Use of directional antennas.

(4) Proper use of brevity codes and radio procedures.

(5) Secure communications equipment.

b. Information security. Plans and orders must be safeguarded; information must be limited to those with a need to know.

c. Deception operations. It is often appropriate and necessary for the AATFC to employ deception operations to ensure the success of his mission. They may include:

(1) Firing false artillery preparation.

(2) Making false insertions.

(3) Maneuvering forces to other areas away from the objective.

(4) All other infantry deception techniques.

d. Passive security. This includes camouflage, countersurveillance, noise and light discipline, warning devices, and rapid troop insertions, plus:

(1) Tactical dispersion of helicopters and units; PZs and LZs must not be congested.

(2) Keeping helicopter FARPs well to the rear and displacing them frequently.

(3) Marking PZs and LZs to avoid compromise.

(4) Careful planning of flight routes and altitudes, using terrain masking to deny the enemy direct observation.

(5) Using multiple PZs, LZs, and routes.

(6) Using the speed and maneuverability of helicopters to gain surprise.

e. Active security. These measures include employment of patrols, observation post, and reconnaissance. In air assault operations, active security measures include:

(1) Employment of air reconnaissance units to provide early warning around LZs and objective areas.

(2) Suppression of enemy intelligence gathering capability.

(3) Air force reconnaissance capability.

(4) Employment of long-range surveillance units (LRSU) of the division's military intelligence battalion.

3-9. Army airspace command and control.

Army airspace command and control (A2C2) are considered early in the planning stage to resolve conflicts and provide for the safe movement of friendly aircraft. Controlling conflict of airspace use should be executed by SOP, directives, and other passive measures because radio communications and positive control of all aircraft may not be possible during actual operations. (See Appendix G for a discussion of A2C2).

Ground Tactical Plan:

3-10. General.

The foundation of a successful air assault operation is the commander's ground tactical plan, around which subsequent planning is based. The ground tactical plan specifies actions in the objective area to ultimately accomplish the mission and address subsequent operations.

3-11. Elements of the ground tactical plan.

a. The ground tactical plan for an air assault operation contains essentially the same elements as any other infantry attack but differs in that it is prepared to capitalize on speed and mobility in order to achieve surprise. Assault echelons are placed on or near the objective and organized so as to be capable of immediate seizure of objectives and rapid consolidation for subsequent operations. If adequate combat power cannot be introduced quickly into the objective area, then the air assault force must land away from the objective and build up combat power. The air assault force then assaults like any other infantry unit and the effectiveness of the air assault operation is diminished.

b. The scheme of maneuver may assume a variety of possibilities depending on the commander's evaluation of METT-T including, in particular, the availability of LZs in the area. The plan should include:

(1) Missions of all task force elements and methods for employment.

(2) Zones of attack, sectors, or areas of operations with graphic control measures.

(3) Task organization to include command relationships.

(4) Location and size of reserves.

(5) Fire support to include graphic control measures.

(6) Combat service support.

NOTE: This plan is prepared by the AATF staff with input from all task force elements and is in sufficient detail to facilitate understanding by subordinate commanders. It is imperative that all aircrews know this ground tactical plan and the ground commander's intent.

The Landing Plan:

3-12. General.

a. The landing plan must support the ground tactical plan. This plan sequences elements into the area of operations, ensuring that units arrive at designated locations and times prepared to execute the ground tactical plan.

b. General considerations in developing the landing plan are:

(1) The availability, location, and size of potential LZs are overriding factors.

(2) The AATF is most vulnerable during landing.

(3) Elements must land with tactical integrity.

(4) Troops are easily disoriented if the briefed landing direction changes, and they are not kept informed.

(5) Initially, there may be no other friendly units in the area. The AATF must land prepared to fight in any direction.

(6) The landing plan should offer flexibility so that a variety of options are available in developing a scheme of maneuver.

(7) Supporting fires (artillery, naval gunfire, CAS, attack helicopters) must be planned in and around each LZ.

(8) Although the objective may be beyond the range of supporting artillery fire, artillery or mortars may be brought into the landing zone(s) early to provide fire support for subsequent lifts and on the objective.

(9) The plan should include provisions for resupply and medical evacuation by air.

3-13. Selection of landing zones.

a. Selection criteria. Landing zones are selected by the AATFC or his S3 with technical advice from the AMC or his liaison officer. They do so using the following criteria:

(1) Location. It can be located on, near, or away from the objective, depending on the factors of METT-T.

(2) Capacity. The size determines how much combat power can be landed at one time. This also determines the need for additional LZs or separation between serials.

(3) Alternates. An alternate LZ should be planned for each primary LZ selected to ensure flexibility.

(4) Enemy disposition and capabilities. Enemy troop concentrations, air defenses, and their capability to react to an AATF landing nearby are considered when selecting an LZ.

(5) Cover and concealment. Landing zones are selected that deny enemy observation and acquisition of friendly ground and air elements while they are en route to and/or from (and in) the LZ.

(6) Obstacles. If possible, the AATF should land on the enemy side of obstacles when attacking and use obstacles to protect LZs from the enemy at other times. Landing zones must be free of obstacles. Engineers must be organized for contingency breaching of obstacles.

(7) Identification from the air. Landing zones should be readily identifiable from the air. They should be marked with chemical lights, preferably infrared type, if the assault is conducted with personnel wearing night vision goggles.

NOTE: This assumes the presence of a friendly reconnaissance unit that has reconned and marked the LZs.

(8) Approach and departure routes. Approach and departure flight routes should avoid continued flank exposure of aircraft to the enemy.

(9) Weather. Reduced visibility or strong winds may preclude or limit the use of marginal LZs.

b. Options to consider. If there are options available in selecting LZS, the ones that best facilitate mission accomplishment are chosen. This choice involves whether to land on or near the objective, or to land away from it and maneuver forces on the ground to the objective. Factors considered in making that determination are:

(1) Combat power. This includes maneuver elements, firepower, and combat support assets that can be introduced into the area early in the operation (usually dependent upon the number of aircraft employed and availability of suitable LZs).

(2) Enemy. This includes enemy strength and disposition in and around the objective area, to include air defense systems.

(3) Surprise. This is a goal that may be attained by careful use of terrain, cover and concealment, darkness, or reduced visibility created by weather or smoke. Surprise is sometimes achieved by landing on the objective.

(4) Time. Time that is available for mission accomplishment. Limited time to complete the mission generally favors landing on or near the objective.

c. Landing zone characteristics. In addition to deciding where to land in relation to the objective, a decision is made on whether to use a single LZ or multiple LZs.

(1) Advantages of a single LZ.

(a) Allows concentration of combat power in one location (if the LZ is large enough).

(b) Facilitates control of the operation.

(c) Concentrates supporting fires in and around the LZ. Firepower is diffused if more than one LZ preparation is required.

(d) Provides better security for subsequent lifts.

(e) Requires fewer attack helicopters for security.

(f) Reduces the number of flight routes in the objective area, making it more difficult for enemy intelligence sources to detect the air assault operation.

(g) Centralizes any required resupply operations.

(h) Concentrates efforts of limited LZ control personnel and engineers on one LZ.

(i) Requires less planning and rehearsal time.

(2) Advantages of multiple LZs.

(a) Avoids grouping assets in one location and creating a lucrative target for enemy mortars, artillery, and CAS.

(b) Allows rapid dispersal of ground elements to accomplish tasks in separate areas.

(c) Reduces the enemy's ability to detect and react to the initial lift.

(d) Forces the enemy to fight in more than one direction.

(e) Reduces the possibility of troop congestion in one LZ.

(f) Eliminates aircraft congestion on one LZ.

(g) Makes it difficult for the enemy to determine the size of the air assault force and the exact location of supporting weapons.

NOTE: If the objective is designated by a number, the LZ should be designated by a letter or code word to avoid confusion and preclude mix-ups. This avoids having an objective (OBJ) and LZ with the same designator; for example, LZ 1 and OBJ 1.

3-14. Landing formations.

Aircraft formations on the LZ should facilitate off-loading and deployment for the assault. The number and type of aircraft, and the configuration and size of the LZ, may dictate the formation. Because contact is expected in the LZ, elements are landed ready to employ fire and movement. An LZ formation should not be a picture-perfect formation with standardized distances between aircraft. Landing aircraft rapidly select a SAFE landing area as close to concealment as possible to reduce troop exposures. (NOTE: If possible, the PZ formation is the same.) This provides troops a preview of the LZ and gives them an idea of where they will be located (upon landing) in relation to other elements.

3-15. Fires to support the landing plan.

a. Frequently, it is desirable to make the initial assault without preparatory fires in order to achieve tactical surprise. However, preparations are planned for each LZ so that they can be fired if needed.

b. Planned fires for air assault operations should be intense and short but with a high volume of fire to maximize surprise and shock effect. The fires should end just before the first assault element's landing.

c. When developing fire support plans, consideration is given to:

(1) Deception. False preparations are fired into areas other than the objective or LZ area.

(2) Loss of surprise. A preparation of long duration may reduce the possibility of surprise.

(3) Availability of fire support. The fire support officer (FSO) considers assets that can fire a preparation and coordinates with the artillery unit to arrange the preparation. Preparations by tactical aircraft or attack helicopters may be the only viable alternative in many cases.

(4) Significant targets. A known or suspected enemy force, regardless of size, warrants an LZ preparation.

(5) Obstacles to landing and maneuver. Some ordnance used in preparation (artillery, bombs, napalm) can cause craters, tree blowdown, fires, and LZ obscuration and therefore may not be desirable.

(6) Scheduling fires. Fires are scheduled to be lifted or shifted to coincide with the arrival times of aircraft formations.

(7) Positive control measures. Control measures must be established for lifting or shifting fires.

Air Movement Plan:

3-16. General.

a. The air movement plan is based on the ground tactical and landing plans. It specifies the schedule and provides instructions for air movement of troops, equipment, and supplies from PZs to LZs. It also provides coordinating instructions regarding air routes, air control points, and aircraft speeds, altitudes, and formations. The planned use of attack helicopters, to include security and linkup locations (if different from PZ), should also be included in the air movement plan. (When operations involve multiple lifts from the same PZ, a lift table is prepared to ensure lifts are properly organized.)

b. The air movement plan is normally developed in coordination with the AMC, or the aviation liaison officer, who provides technical assistance and recommendations.

3-17. Development of tentative flight routes.

Tentative flight routes are developed to control, protect, and sequence aircraft movement. Careful consideration is given to the terrain and enemy forces. The AATF S2, S3, and AMC assist the AATFC in developing flight routes. The basic methods of developing tentative flight routes is by map study or by photo review when time permits, considering the locations of friendly units, enemy dispositions and air defense systems, and PZs and/or LZs. A flight route consists of a start point (SP), release point (RP), and a flight path between the two. The fire support plan should include fire planning along the flight routes.

3-l8. Designation of start point and release point.

The first step is to identify tentative SPs and RPs (Figure 3-2). The distance from the PZ to the SP should be no less than three to five kilometers to allow aircraft to achieve the desired airspeed, altitude, and formation after lift-off. The distance from the RP to the LZ should allow the flight leader to reconfigure the formation and execute a tactical formation landing. In locating SPs and RPS, the following considerations apply:

a. Locate three to five kilometers from PZs and LZs respectively. This allows two to three minutes flying time for coordination of the flight's en route procedures.

b. Locate according to weather, obstacles, and enemy positions.

c. Locate to facilitate lift-off and landing into the wind by the best flight path.

3-19. Air movement table.

a. The air movement table:

(1) Contains aircraft allocations.

(2) Designates number and type of aircraft in each serial.

(3) Specifies departure point, route to and from loading area, and loading, lift-off, and landing times.

b. The table is prepared jointly by the AATF staff and aviation personnel and it is completed in detail since it serves as the primary movement document.

NOTE: The table controls AATF movement from PZ to LZ as air assault forces fly to the LZ utilizing radio listening silence, if possible.

c. The table ensures that all personnel, equipment, and supplies are accounted for in the movement, that each aircraft is fully loaded, correctly positioned in the flight, and directed to the right LZ (Figure 3-3). The table must also include the refuel schedule for all lifts, if required.

3-20. Development of flight routes.

a. Flight routes are developed based on tactical and technical factors. It may be necessary for a route to pass through an adjacent unit's sector. When that is the case, approval from that unit is obtained and coordination is made. Regardless of route direction or location, certain criteria are considered.

b. Seldom are all characteristics present in any one situation; one or more may have to be omitted. Flight routes:

(1) Are as short as possible, consistent with other considerations.

(2) Avoid turns in excess of 45 degrees, when formation flying is required, to facilitate control of the aircraft formation.

(3) Provide terrain masking to deny exposure to enemy observation, direct fire weapons, and radar acquisition, if possible.

(4) Provide cover when terrain permits, placing terrain mass and/or vegetation between the enemy and the aircraft.

(5) Provide for ease of navigation (day or night).

(6) Avoid masking friendly fires, particularly supporting artillery.

(7) Avoid known enemy units and air defense positions.

(8) Avoid overflight of built-up areas.

3-21. Flight corridor.

a. When there is competition for airspace, it may be necessary to modify the flight route(s) and designate a flight corridors). The corridor reserves airspace around a flight route for AATF use, and prevents artillery, tactical air (TACAIR), and other elements from firing or flying through when it is in use.

b. Authority to establish a flight corridor is obtained from the brigade and/or division commanders). Designated flight corridors are coordinated through airspace management channels. This ensures that airspace within corridors is not violated.

c. The corridor begins as a flight route and is then modified as required. The size of corridors varies. Normally, they extend 200 to 300 meters on either side of the designated flight route, and 500 feet above and below the route flight altitude.

d. Helicopter formations operating at terrain flight (low) altitudes do not require minimum altitude corridor designations. The upper air limit of the corridor may vary and would be specified by the headquarters establishing it.

e. If it is necessary to restrict the operational area to only those aircraft directly involved in the air assault operation, a restricted area can be established by the airspace management element.

3-22. Flight axis.

a. The flight axis is another variation of the flight route. It is a flight route that has width (like the corridor) but does not have airspace reserved to a specific altitude (as does the corridor).

b. The flight axis permits deviation laterally along the flight route but does not restrict the employment of other assets. It gives the AMC a choice in selecting en route formations and freedom to alter direction without coordinating a new flight route.

3-23. Expedient flight routes.

These routes are established with checkpoints. If time is not available to develop and disseminate PZs, LZs, and flight route information, the commander can define an expedient route by reference to checkpoints (Figure 3-4).

3-24. Flight route control measures.

a. Control measures assist in navigation and provide control to ensure the AATF arrives in the LZ on time and in sequence.

b. Air control points (ACP) designate each point where the flight route changes direction (Figure 3-5). They include readily identifiable topographic features or points marked by electronic navigational aids. A route may have as many ACPs as necessary to control the air movement. The SPs and RPs are also air control points.

c. An ACP may be further designated as a communication checkpoint (CCP). A CCP is a point along the flight route that serial commanders report to the AMC. Radio transmissions are made only when necessary. If a report is required, the transmission is short. This is possible by using codes. For example, the short radio transmission, "One, One King," could mean that the first serial of lift I is crossing CCP King.

3-25. Designation of routes.

a. Once tentative flight routes are identified, they are designated for use by each unit. When large groups of aircraft are employed, dispersion is achieved by using multiple routes. However, with large serials it is often necessary to use fewer routes, or even a single route, in order to concentrate available supporting fires. Also, the number of alternate and return routes may be limited.

b. Primary, alternate, and return routes to be used by each subordinate unit are designated. When selecting routes, the following factors are considered:

(1) Interference with ground action. Overflying ground elements may interfere with their supporting fire. Flight routes should be clear of the gun-target line when possible.

(2) Support of landing plan. To reduce vulnerability of the air assault force, flight routes should facilitate rapid approach, landing, and departure from selected LZs.

(3) Enemy ground and air capabilities. Selected flight routes make maximum use of terrain, cover, and concealment to minimize enemy observation and target acquisition.

(4) Available fire support. Flight routes allow support from all available resources.

(5) Available air cover. Flight routes are identified in order to provide air cover for friendly forces en route.

(6) Weather conditions. Flight routes remain usable based on prevailing weather during execution of the air assault operation.

(7) Terrain. Flight routes use terrain to maximum advantage to reduce vulnerability of the aircraft formations.

(8) Time (distance) from PZ to LZ. Flight routes are as short as possible to reduce flying time.

3-26. Dissemination of route information.

Maps or overlays containing flight route information are prepared at AATF headquarters and disseminated to subordinate and support units. (Overlays are often used.) Flight routes and corridors are designated by a letter, number, or word (Figure 3-6).

3-27. En route formations.

The flight's formation is dictated by the terrain, enemy situation, and the degree of control required. Regardless of the specific formation, aircraft are staggered and the distance between them varies according to the terrain being crossed. The AMC and/or flight leader selects the en route formation. The aircraft land in the formation specified by the air movement table (Figure 3-7).

3-28. Terrain flight modes.

A specific en route flight altitude is not designated. Pilots may use one of three terrain-flight modes as dictated by the mission and the Threat (Figure 3-8).

a. Nap-of-the-earth flight. This is flown at varying airspeeds and altitudes as close to the earth's surface as possible while following the contours of the earth. It is a weaving flight path that remains oriented along the general axis of movement and takes advantage of terrain masking.

b. Contour flight. This is flown at low altitude conforming generally to the contours of the terrain. The flight is characterized by varying altitudes and varying airspeed.

c. Low level flight. This is flown at low altitude, with constant heading, airspeed, and altitude to facilitate speed and ease of movement while minimizing detection. This mode of flight is normally used only in rear areas.

d. Factors affecting flight attitude. These include:

(1) Enemy. The greater the enemy air defense threat, the lower the flight altitude.

(2) Terrain. Aircraft must clear all terrain obstacles and still reduce exposure to enemy air defense weapons and observation.

(3) Navigation. It is usually easier to navigate at higher altitudes, but the risk of detection by the enemy is greater.

(4) Weather. Ground fog, or haze, requires higher altitudes whereas a low ceiling requires lower altitudes.

(5) Flight distance. If the distance is short, the flight does not take time to climb to a high altitude.

(6) Need for surprise. Surprise is more likely when using low altitude.

(7) Pilot fatigue. Terrain flying is more fatiguing for aircrews.

3-29. Supporting fires along the flight route.

a. Fires along the flight route are planned to suppress known or suspected enemy positions. These fires should be intense and of short duration. Multiple target engagement techniques should be utilized (groups, series).

b. Fire plans cover the PZs, flight routes, and LZs. Fire support plans include suppression of enemy air defense systems and smoke to protect formations from enemy detection. This requires aggressive fire planning by the fire support officer and direct coordination with FA and mortar fire direction centers and other fire support elements.

c. All available fire support is used to suppress and/or destroy enemy weapons including TACAIR, artillery, and attack helicopters.

d. Support may consist of smoke, chaff (air-dropped, shredded aluminum foil to foul radar), or other countermeasures for suppressing or confusing enemy air defense systems.

e. On-call fires are planned along the flight route to ensure rapid adjustment on targets of opportunity.

f. During night operations, the use of illumination fire requires detailed planning. Illumination can interfere with night vision goggles and cause unsafe conditions.

3-30. Air movement timing.

a. A successful air assault operation is a sequence of actions carefully planned and precisely executed.

b. The basis for timing is the time when the first aircraft in the first lift of the operation is to touch down on the LZ. It is referred to as H-hour. All times in air assault operations are referenced from H-hour (landing time column, air movement table). The H-hour in air assault operations is equivalent to the attack time in a mission order. If delays are encountered due to weather or aircraft delays, the commander announces a new H-hour (Figure 3-9).

c. Normal distance from RP to LZ is three to five kilometers. Planning time for navigating this distance is approximately two minutes, depending upon air speed (Figure 3-10). In order for the first aircraft to land in the LZ at H-hour, it must reach the RP at H-2 minutes (RP time column, air movement table).



d. The air movement table requires time for detailed planning. For large operations, an LO from the supporting aviation element is required.

e. The importance of an air movement table should not be underemphasized. As stated previously, C2 procedures should be planned to allow continued execution despite loss of radio communications. If the AMC and lift flight leaders have air movement tables in their possession, they can continue the mission without radio communications.

(1) Flight time. The following example explains how to compute the time required to cover the distance from the SP to the RP. These times are computed for the entire length of the flight route from the SP to the RP. The length of each of the flight routes is measured so that en route times can be computed.

(2) Round up to next higher whole number. Figure 3-11 is an example of how the formula is to be used:

3-31. Lift-off time, start point time.

a. Lift-off time must be determined first in order to meet the LZ time. The total flight route time is determined by adding the time to fly from the SP to the RP to the LZ. In the preceding example, flight route time was determined to be eight minutes. The flight time from the RP to the LZ is two minutes. In this case, SP time would be H-10 arrived at as follows:

RP time = H-2 (two minutes for RP to LZ).

SP time = H-10 (eight minutes flight route time plus two minutes from RP to LZ).

b. To determine the lift-off time, add the time between PZ and SP. Continuing the example, if time between PZ and SP is two minutes, the -

RP time = H2.

SP time = H-10.

Lift-off time = H-12 (this includes the two minutes from PZ to SP).

c. All times (lift-off, SP, and landing) are recorded in the proper columns of theair movement table (Figure 3-12).

3-32. Loading time.

a. Loading time is the time required, before lift-off, to load the aircraft. Time to load is normally dependent on prior training, equipment to be carried, and light conditions. Night operations require more loading time. Once loading time is determined, it is added to the previously computed times (Figure 3-13).

b. If a unit requires four minutes to load, in order to meet the lift-off time of H-12, it begins loading no later than H-16 minutes (loading time and lift-off time columns, air movement table).

c. Slingloading also requires additional time that must be calculated into this plan. The use of slingloads may also reduce the en route airspeed.

d. The aviation and ground elements each begin movement to the PZ to start loading at the prescribed time.

e. With the air movement time schedule completed for the initial elements, the air movement table is completed by building on the initial times.

3-33. Loading time, second lift.

The first lift is planned working back from H-hour. Planning for the second lift is forward from H-hour since the en route times are established (Figure 3-14). However, before annotating the air movement time for the second element, the time required for the aircraft to return from the LZ to the PZ (along the return route) is computed. This is done employing the same method used in computing initial flight time. For example, if it is two minutes flight time from the PZ to the SP, two minutes from the RP to the LZ, and eight minutes en route, then once the aircraft have unloaded, it takes 12 minutes to return to the PZ (lift, serial, loads, and loading time columns, air movement table).

3-34. Second lift.

If it takes four minutes to load the second lift, then the lift-off time is recorded as H+16 minutes. Subsequently, if it takes two minutes to get from PZ to SP, SP time is H+18 minutes. If the flight requires 10 minutes to get from SP to RP, RP time is H+28 minutes. Once again, allow two minutes for transition from RP to the LZ; the landing time for the second element on its LZ is H+30 minutes. Subsequent times are all computed in the same manner (landing time column, air movement table) (Figure 3-15).

3-35. Planning for refueling.

a. An accurate table must also contain the times involved in aircraft refueling.

b. Refueling is planned so that a flight completes refueling before the serial that is scheduled to be refueled last gets critically low on fuel. If only a portion of the flight can be refueled at the FARP, the first serial might have to refuel as much as an hour before it needs refueling. The other serials continue the lift operation until it is their turn to refuel. The plan should allow a smooth, continuous rotation of aircraft into and out of the FARP (Figure 3-16).

Figure 3-16. Sequencing serials into the FARP.

e. The number of aircraft that can refuel at one time is divided into the number of aircraft in the lift. The result is the number of separate trips to the FARP to refuel the entire lift one time.

d. The result is multiplied by the time required for the aircraft to refuel. The answer gives the total time required to refuel one time. For example, if four serials require 15 minutes each to refuel, it takes one hour to refuel the entire lift. (This time includes time for repositioning to the PZ.)

e. This figure is subtracted from the available flying time to determine at what point in the mission the refueling process must begin.

f. The physical planning for refueling begins when the aircraft arrive in the PZ for loading. Once the plans are developed, refueling becomes a part of the table (Figure 3-17).

Loading Plan:

3-36. General.

The loading plan is based on the air movement plan. It ensures that troops, equipment, and supplies are loaded on the correct aircraft. Unit integrity is maintained when aircraft loads are planned. However, assault forces and equipment may be cross-loaded so that command and control assets, all types of combat power, and a mix of weapons arrive at the LZ ready to fight. Aircraft loads are also placed in priority to establish a bump plan. A bump plan ensures that essential troops and equipment are loaded ahead of less critical loads in case of aircraft breakdown or other problems. Below brigade level, loading plans are established by SOPS. In any case, planning must cover the organization and operation of the PZ including load positions, day and night markings, and communications. 'he loading plan is most important when mixing internal and external loads and/or when mixing aircraft types (lift and medium helicopters).

3-37. Coordination with air mission control.

a. Loading plans are carefully coordinated with the AMC or the aviation LO. Copies of the loading plan should be distributed to the aviation LO, command and control elements, AMC, and the PZ control officer.

b. For battalion or larger air assault operations, a written plan may be required to:

(1) Control movement of troops, supplies, and equipment to and about the PZ.

(2) Designate unit loading sites.

(3) Control timing for arrival, loading, and departing of aircraft.

c. The requirement for detailed, written plans can be reduced by having adequate unit SOPs covering PZ operations and loading plans. Regardless of SOP adequacy, the loading phase should receive command attention to ensure that it goes smoothly. A well-planned and properly executed loading operation is imperative to mission success.

3-38. Pickup zone selection.

a. Pickup zone identification is the first step in the loading plan development.
NOTES:

1. Alternate PZs are identified at the same time. The goal of PZ identification is to locate suitable areas to accommodate the lift aircraft.

2. The specifications (such as degree of slope, wind speeds, and distance between aircraft) used in this chapter to identify and select PZs, LZs, and flight routes, are planning guides for the ground unit. They may be adjusted by the AMC based on his evaluation of his unit's level of training.

b. Extraction under pressure is also a function of successful PZ selection. Selected PZs must facilitate delivery of suppressive fires and continuous security of elements to be extracted and the helicopters.

c. Figure 3-18 shows the technical factors that must be considered in selecting PZs.


d. Once available PZs are identified, the AATFC and his S3 select and assign PZs to be used by each unit. Pickup zone criteria include:

(1) Number. Multiple PZs avoid concentrating forces in one area.

(2) Size. Each PZ should accommodate all supporting aircraft at once, if possible.

(3) Proximity to troops. Where possible, the selected PZs should not require extensive ground movement (to the PZ) by troops.

(4) Accessibility. Pickup zones should be accessible to vehicles to move support assets and infantry.

(5) Vulnerability to attack. Selected PZs should be masked by terrain from enemy observation.

(6) Preparation. It is better to select PZs that are usable as they are, or require only limited clearing (Figure 3-19).

3-39. Pickup zone control officer.

a. The pickup zone control officer organizes, controls, and coordinates operationsin PZs selected by the AATFC. (The S4 selects and controls logistical PZs.)

b. The PZCO accomplishes the following:

(1) Forms control group. To manage operations, the PZCO forms a control group to assist him. It may include air traffic control, subordinate units, and support personnel (manpower to clear the PZ; security). The PZCO selects a central location to position the group. The PZCO is designated by the AATFC, usually the S3 Air. For battalion air assault operations, each company commander appoints a PZCO who operates a company PZ for the battalion.

(2) Establishes communications. The PZCO should communicate on two primary radio frequencies: one to control movement and loading of units, and one to control aviation elements (combat aviation net). Alternate frequencies are provided as necessary.

(3) Plans and initiates fire support. He plans fires near PZs to provide all-round protection (from available support) without endangering arrival and departure of troops or aircraft.

(4) Plans and initiates security. The PZCO ensures that adequate security is provided. Security protects the main body as it assembles, moves to the PZ, and is lifted out. Security elements should be provided by other forces if the PZ is within a friendly area. Security elements should be provided by other forces if the PZ is within a friendly area. Security comes from AATF resources if it is to be extracted from the objective area.

(5) Clears PZ of obstacles.

(6) Marks the PZ.

3-40. Pickup zone marking.

a. The PZCO directs the marking of PZs. An effective method is to name the PZ by color and mark it accordingly (by that color) to direct where aircraft will land.

b. Red is never used to mark an aircraft landing position. It is used to mark landing obstacles such as trees or stumps in the landing area.

c. Regardless of the type of markers, the PZ is marked to indicate where aircraft are to land and coincides with the selected PZ aircraft formation.

d. An effective method is to have several individuals in each unit paint (and carry) an extra camouflage cover or a modified (cut to size) VS-17 panel. The colored covers, when displayed, indicate where the lead aircraft lands.

3-41. Movement to pickup zone.

a. Ground and aviation unit movement to the PZ is scheduled so that only the troops to load, and the helicopter to be loaded, arrive at the PZ at the same time. This prevents congestion, preserves security, and reduces vulnerability to enemy actions on the PZ (Figure 3-20).

b. To coordinate the movement of units to the PZ, the PZCO:

(1) Selects troop assembly areas, holding areas, and routes of movement. A holding area is located close to the PZ. It is used only when the assembly area is some distance away and does not allow timely movement to the PZ.

(2) Determines movement time of ground units to PZ.

(3) Specifies arrival time(s) and sees that movement of units remains on schedule.

3-42. Airloading table.

a. At company and lower levels, the airloading table assigns each man and major items of equipment or supplies to a specific aircraft (chalk).

b. The airloading table is an accountability tool, a loading manifest for each aircraft.

c. When time is limited, the table can be put on a sheet of paper from a squad leader's notebook. It should list soldiers (by name) and equipment to be loaded on each chalk. These lists are left with a specified representative in the area for consolidation or exchange between aircraft troop commanders (senior person in each aircraft load). This procedure ensures that if an aircraft is lost, a list of personnel and equipment on board is available.

3-43. Load planning.

a. During preparation of the loading tables, unit leaders at all levels attempt to maintain the following:

(1) Tactical integrity of units. When planning loads for air assault operations, fire teams and squads are loaded intact on the same aircraft, and platoons in the same serial. This ensures integrity as a fighting unit upon landing. The commander's goal is to load his unit so that unit integrity is maintained at every level.

(2) Self-sufficiency of loads. Each unit load should be functional by itself (whenever possible).

(a) Every towed item is accompanied by its prime mover.

(b) Crews are loaded with their vehicle or weapon.

(c) Component parts accompany the major items of equipment.

(d) Ammunition is carried with the weapon.

(e) Sufficient personnel are on board to unload cargo carried.

(f) Communication between chalks, if possible, without using the aircraft radios.

(3) Tactical cross-loading. Loads should be planned so that all leaders, or all crew-served weapons, are not loaded on the same aircraft. Thus, if an aircraft is lost, the mission is not seriously hampered. For example, loading the platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and all the squad leaders on the same helicopter, or loading more than one machine gun team on the same aircraft, are violations of cross-loading principles.

b. Another consideration is to determine whether internal or external loading is the best delivery method for equipment and supplies. Helicopters loaded internally can fly faster and are more maneuverable. Externally (sling) loaded helicopters fly slower and are less maneuverable; however, they can be loaded and unloaded more rapidly than internally loaded helicopters. The method used depends largely on availability of sling and rigging equipment.

NOTE: Supplies loaded externally (although loaded rapidly) can present problems if the supplies are destined for more than one location or unit.

3-44. Aircraft bump plan.

a. Each aircraft load has a bump sequence designated on its airloading table. Bump priority ensures that the most essential personnel and equipment arrive at the objective area first. It specifies personnel and equipment that may be bumped and delivered later.

b. If all personnel within the load cannot be lifted, individuals must know who is to offload and in what sequence. This ensures that key personnel are not bumped arbitrarily. Also, bump sequence is designated for aircraft within each serial or flight. This sequence is listed on the air movement table.

c. This also ensures that key aircraft loads are not left in the PZ. When an aircraft within a serial or flight cannot lift off, and key personnel are on board, they offload and reboard another aircraft that has priority.

3-45. Aircraft bump-and-straggler control.

A PZ bump-and-straggler collection point is specified by company or larger units. Personnel not moved as planned report to this location, are accounted for, regrouped, and rescheduled by the PZCO for later delivery to appropriate LZs.

3-46. Lifts, serials, and loads.

To maximize operational control, aviation assets are designed into lifts, serials, and loads (Figure 3-21).

a. Lifts. A lift is one sortie of all utility and cargo aircraft assigned to a mission. That is, each time all assigned aircraft pick up troops and/or equipment and set them down on the LZ, one lift is completed. The second lift is completed when all lift aircraft place their second load on the LZ.

b. Serials.

(1) There may be times when a lift is too large to fly in one formation. In such cases, the lift is organized into a number of serials. A serial is a tactical grouping of two or more aircraft under the control of a serial commander (aviator), and separated from other tactical groupings within the lift by time or space. The use of serials may be necessary to maintain effective control of aviation assets. For example, if NOE flight is used, it would be difficult to control 16 aircraft as a single increment; however, a 16-aircraft lift with four serials of four aircraft each could be more easily controlled.

(2) Serials may also be required when the capacity of available PZs or LZs is limited. If there is a lift of 16 aircraft and available PZs and/or LZs will accommodate only four aircraft, it is best to organize into four serials of four aircraft each.

(3) Serials are employed to take advantage of available flight routes. If there are several acceptable flight routes, the AATFC may choose to employ serials to avoid concentrating his force along one flight route. If the commander wants all his forces to land simultaneously in a single LZ, he does so by having the serials converge at a common RP before landing. With a lift of 16 aircraft and four available flight routes, the AATFC could use four serials of four aircraft each. Each serial would use a different flight route. Each time there is a new lift, a new serial begins. For example, in lift one, there are serials one through four; in lift two, serials again start with one.

c. Loads.

(1) Within each lift, there is also a specific number of loads. A load is personnel and/or equipment designated to be moved by a specific aircraft. When planning the air movement, each aircraft within the lift is termed a load. For example, within a lift of 10, there are aircraft loads one through 10. For each lift thereafter, there will also be loads one through 10. Each aircraft is accounted for within each lift.

(2) An aircraft load may also be referred to as a chalk load," "chalk number," or a "chalk." Loads also must be designated within serials just as they are within lifts. Counting within the serials is continuous up to the total number of aircraft in the lift. For example, in a lift of 16 aircraft in lift one, serial one, there may be loads one through four. In lift one, serial two, there may be loads five through eight. In lift one, serial three, there may be loads nine through 12. Finally, in lift one, serial four, there may be loads 13 through 16 (Figure 3-22).

3-47. Sequence of departure.

The sequence of departure from PZs is based on the mission to be accomplished by each subordinate unit upon landing. Unit priorities are based on the sequence of arrival at their LZs. Units are scheduled to depart (in order) based on en route time to the LZ. For example, if Company A is to land first (at H-hour), and Company B second (at H+5), and Company B is 15 minutes farther (in flight time) from the LZ, it may depart the PZ before Company A.

Staging Plan:

3-48. General.

The staging plan is based on the loading plan and prescribes the arrival time of ground units (troops, equipment, and supplies) at the PZ in the proper order for movement.

3-49. Procedures.

Loads must be ready before aircraft arrive at the PZ; usually, ground units are expected to be in PZ posture 15 minutes before aircraft arrive. The staging plan also restates the PZ organization, defines flight routes to the PZ, and provides instructions for linkup of all aviation elements. Air-to-air linkup of aviation units should be avoided, especially at night when night vision goggles are being used.

Air Mission Briefing:

3-50. General.

The air mission briefing (AMB) is the last coordination meeting of key participants in an air assault mission and ensures that key aviation personnel are briefed and that the details of each plan are finalized.

3-51. Content.

The briefing covers the details of all planning and preparation. It covers the operation from beginning to end, which includes the five plans explained previously, and the completed air movement table (Figure 3-23).

3-52. Participants.

The AMB should include, as a minimum, the S2, S3, fire support officer, aviation liaison officer (LO), ADA liaisons, aviation unit operations officer, AMC, battle team captains (BTC) from air reconnaissance and attack helicopter units, and the ground tactical commander of the unit being inserted. It may also include the S3 Air, communication-electronics officer (CEO), and the S4.

3-53. Location.

The briefing is conducted at a location specified by the AATFC and is dependent upon the amount of time available before execution of the mission. In determining the location, factors to consider are:

Time required to assemble key personnel.

Availability of information (intelligence and status of the aviation assets). Availability of planners.

Operations security (multiple aircraft in forward battalion locations).

Vulnerability to enemy observation and fires.

3-54. Time.

The AMB should be held as soon as possible after the reverse planning sequence is completed. Applying the one-third, two-thirds rule should allow enough time for all element leaders to brief their subordinate units. For example, with a 12-hour warning, the briefing should be conducted eight hours before the first aircraft arrives at the PZ. This allows four hours to plan the operation. When air assault forces are required to conduct hasty assaults, there is little time for planning. Establishing habitual relationships and SOPs reduces planning and preparation time. Aircrew endurance must be considered when establishing a time for the AMB. If the operation will be of long duration, an early AMB may not be advisable.

3-55. Air mission briefing format.

The following format is a guide. Its use will help ensure that essential information is included in air assault mission briefings.

(Classification)

TASK FORCE ORGANIZATION

1 . Situation.

a. Enemy forces (especially troop concentrations and locations and types of ADA assets).

b. Friendly forces.

c. Weather (ceiling, visibility, wind, temperature, pressure and density altitude, sunrise and sunset, moonrise and moonset, percent of moon illumination, end evening nautical twilight, beginning morning nautical twilight, PZ and LZ altitudes, and weather outlook).

2. Mission. Clear, concise statement of the task that is to be accomplished (who, what, and when, and, as appropriate, why and where).

3. Execution.

a. Ground tactical plan.

b. Fire support plan to include suppression of enemy air defenses.

c. Air defense artillery plans.

d. Engineer support plan.

e. Tactical air support.

f. Aviation unit tasks.

g. Staging plan (both primary and alternate PZs).

(1) Pickup zone location.

(2) Pickup zone time.

(3) Pickup zone security.

(4) Flight route to PZ.

(5) Pickup zone marking and control.

(6) Landing formation and direction.

(7) Attack and air reconnaissance helicopter linkup with lift elements.

(8) Troop and equipment load.

h. Air movement plan.

(1) Primary and alternate flight routes (SPs, ACPS, and RPs).

(2) Penetration points.

(3) Flight formations) and airspeeds.

(4) Deception measures.

(5) Air reconnaissance and attack helicopter missions.

(6) Abort criteria.

(7) Air movement table.

i. Landing plan (both primary and alternate LZs).

(1) Landing zone location.

(2) Landing zone time.

(3) Landing formation and direction.

(4) Landing zone marking and control.

(5) Air reconnaissance and attack helicopter missions.

(6) Abort criteria.

j. Laager plan (both primary and alternate laager sites).

(1) Laager location.

(2) Laager type (air or ground, shut down or running).

(3) Laager time.

(4) Laager security plan.

(5) Call forward procedure.

k. Extraction plan (both primary and alternate PZs).

(1) Pickup location.

(2) Pickup time.

(3) Air reconnaissance and attack helicopter missions.

(4) Supporting plans.

l. Return air movement plan.

(1) Primary and alternate flight routes (SPs, ACPS, and RPs).

(2) Penetration points.

(3) Flight formations and airspeed.

(4) Air reconnaissance and attack helicopter missions.

(5) Landing zone locations.

(6) Landing zone landing formation and direction.

(7) Landing zone marking and control.

m. Coordinating instructions.

(1) Mission abort.

(2) Downed aircraft procedures.

(3) Vertical helicopter instrument flight recovery procedures.

(4) Weather decision by one-hour increments and weather abort time.

(5) Passenger briefing.

4. Service Support.

a. FARP locations (primary and alternate).

b. Ammunition and fuel requirements.

c. Backup aircraft.

d. Aircraft special equipment requirements, such as cargo hooks and command consoles with headsets.

e. Health service support.

5. Command Signal.

a. Signal.

(1) Radio nets, frequencies, and call signs.

(2) Communications-electronics operation instructions in effect and time of change.

(3) Challenge and password.

(4) Authentication table in effect.

(5) Visual signals.

(6) Navigational aids (frequencies, locations, and operational times).

(7) Identification friend or foe (radar) codes.

(8) Code words for PZ secure, hot, and clean; abort missions; go to alternatePZ and LZ; fire preparation; request extraction; and use alternate route.

b. Command.

(1) Location of air assault task force commander.

(2) Point where air reconnaissance and attack helicopters come under OPCONas aerial maneuver elements.

6. Time Hack. All watches are synchronized.

(Classification)

Offense:

4-1. General.

The air assault attack is the basic type of offensive operation conducted by an AATF. It is the integration of the combat, CS, and CSS elements in the movement into or out of an objective area. Generally, the term "insertion" applies when discussing the air assault into the objective area and the term "extraction" applies when discussing the air assault from the objective area. While these terms are fundamental to all air assault operations, they take on added importance in the attack.

4-2. Attack.

The opportunity to attack may arise during the course of battle, or it may be created by skillful, tactical leadership. Whatever the source, the attack is fast, violent, resolute, shrewd, and coordinated. There are two general types of attack: hasty and deliberate. The major difference between the two is time and enemy information available. The AATF may conduct an attack in conjunction with other forces. The type of action conducted by the larger force usually dictates the type of attack employed by the air assault force.

4-3. Hasty attack.

a. Situations in which an AATF might be called on to execute a hasty attack in support of a larger force are:

(1) During movement to contact by the larger force when unexpected contact is made. The AATF is committed to exploit a tactical advantage or to further develop the tactical situation.

(2) When part of the larger force's deliberate attack plan is modified while the operation is under way. The AATF is committed to reinforce in a weakened area or to exploit a tactical advantage.

(3) At the conclusion of an attack when a further advance is ordered. The AATF is committed to exploit the attack's success and to maintain momentum.

(4) An attack from a defense in which the commander sees an opportunity for offensive action and seizes the initiative.

b. When a hasty attack is considered under any of these circumstances, tentative PZs, LZs, and flight routes throughout the higher unit's zone of action are identified. This permits rapid commitment of the AATF anywhere in the sector. Because the hasty attack is conducted on short notice, there is little time to plan and orders are brief. The AATFC must rely on previous training and SOPs to cover these situations.

c. When the AATF is committed, the AATFC initiates several actions simultaneously. He directs suppressive fires to neutralize the enemy's ability to counter the air assault operation, and he concentrates sufficient combat power to overwhelm the enemy at selected points. While the AATF is en route, support fires suppress or destroy known or suspected enemy positions with priority of fires to the suppression of enemy air defense.

d. As the attack starts, attack helicopter units overmatch and react as necessary while the AATFC and FSO direct FA, mortar, CAS, and other supporting fires. FA and mortars destroy, neutralize, or suppress enemy indirect fire weapons as soon as they are located. Smoke may be used to screen aircraft movement from observation. However, the AATFC is careful that smoke does not obscure the LZ and hinder the landing operation. Airspace coordination must be effected early.

4-4. Deliberate attack.

a. The AATF, as part of a larger force operation, may conduct a deliberate attack. The AATF is provided sufficient time to develop a detailed, coordinated plan; receive additional assets; change task organization as necessary; and gather detailed intelligence. Detailed information about the terrain is collected so that best PZs, LZs, and flight routes can be selected. Air assault objectives are normally in the enemy's rear area, or the attack is from the flank or rear. This will normally preclude or limit the opportunity for leaders to see the terrain and force planners to rely on maps and aerial photographs.

b. When the larger force concentrates its combat power on a narrow front to break through enemy defenses, the AATF may bypass main defenses to destroy artillery positions, command posts, logistics and communications facilities, and/or to secure key terrain in the enemy's rear (Figure 4-1).

Figure 4-1. Landing away from the objective.

c. An attack against a heavier or well-prepared enemy force, particularly on the mechanized and/or armor battlefield, may subject the AATF to devastating firepower. For this reason, the AATFC may land the AATF away from the objective and conduct a dismounted attack in conjunction with friendly mechanized and/or armor forces. The AATFC must also consider that a highly mobile enemy force could encircle the AATF before it moves from an LZ. Consequently, he selects LZs in armor-restrictive terrain and employs antitank weapons and attack helicopter units against likely armor approaches. When used with accurate intelligence, these actions provide time to organize after landing and to attack the objectives.

4-5. Exploitation.

Exploitation is an operation undertaken to follow up success in the attack. Attacks are conducted with two overriding requirements: speed and violence. The attackers bypass pockets of resistance to concentrate on the destruction of the more vulnerable headquarters, combat support, and combat service support units. They disrupt the enemy's command and control; his flow of fuel, ammunition, repair parts; and his air defenses and artillery. This weakens and/or destroys the enemy. Enemy air defenses are avoided or suppressed for the AATF to exploit the situation.

4-6. Pursuit.

a. Pursuit is an offensive action against retreating enemy.Its purpose is toe nvelop the retreating force and destroy it by coordinated fire and maneuver. An AATF, operating as part of the pursuit force, can expect to be ordered to bypass resistance of any kind and move relentlessly to deep objectives that serve as checkpoints for the retreating enemy. The helicopter provides the AATF with the high degree of mobility required to conduct pursuit operations.

b. Air Force tactical aircraft, attack helicopters, and air assault forces can repeatedly attack the flanks of the withdrawing enemy columns, slowing them and aiding in their destruction. Blocking positions can be established on withdrawal routes to trap enemy forces between the encircling force and the direct-pressure force. Field artillery and forward arming and refueling points should be lifted into the encircling force areas as soon as possible.

4-7. Secure and defend.

a. This type of air assault operation is two-phased and requires detailed planning like a deliberate attack. The secure-and-defend mission is conducted when an objective, such as a vital terrain feature, must be seized and retained. The limited staying power of the AATF dictates early linkup with ground units, reinforcement by other units, or extraction from the enemy area.

b. The first phase is an attack to secure terrain to be controlled by the AATF in the initial stages of the assault. This should be a single-lift insertion of sufficient combat power to defeat enemy forces on the objective.

c. The second phase of the operation is the defense of the objective. The AATF normally establishes an airhead. This is a perimeter defense that controls all terrain essential to the defense of the objective. The airhead is large enough to provide operating space for combat, CS, and CSS units. It should include adequate LZs for simultaneous combat assaults using all airlift assets and provide space for landing artillery, follow-on forces, and supplies. The airhead is small enough for a battalion to defend yet large enough to permit defense-in-depth and maneuver of reserves to counter enemy attacks. As a rule, the area an infantry battalion can defend is 3 to 5 kilometers in diameter. Size is dictated by mission, enemy strength and disposition, terrain, and AATF combat power.

d. Boundaries delineate responsibilities of AATF subordinate elements. The airhead is often divided into company-size objectives for the air assault. Each company clears, secures and defends an assigned area of the airhead (which seldom has a rear area). The size sector assigned each company should be within its capability to seize and defend, based on an analysis of METT-T. Boundaries minimize adjustments during the transition from assault to defense. They should also prevent one unit from defending in widely divergent directions. A company facing a dangerous avenue of approach, for example, is assigned a smaller sector than a company facing a less dangerous avenue. Defensive responsibility for an avenue of approach is not divided. The unit assigned the approach also covers any dominating terrain.

e. A terrain feature to be secured in the assault, and vital to AATF mission accomplishment, is designated an assault objective. The assault objective should include terrain that dominates all high-speed approaches into the airhead area. Assault objectives are assigned priorities. Those specified by higher headquarters are given first priority. Others are ranked according to the threat they would pose if controlled by the enemy. A company's sector should include at least one LZ for the assault and to aid in resupply and evacuation.

4-8. Reconnaissance in force.

a. A reconnaissance in force is conducted to determine or test the enemy's disposition and strength or to develop intelligence. It is conducted when the enemy situation is vague. This type of operation is conducted by forces strong enough to accept engagements with the enemy in order to accomplish their mission. The information obtained (for example, major weaknesses in enemy positions), if promptly exploited, may provide a significant tactical advantage. The reconnaissance in force is planned and conducted with elements specifically prepared to find the enemy and develop the situation. Once the units are committed, they are on a "be prepared to fight" status.

b. The reconnaissance in force is an ideal mission for the AATF in an insurgent environment in order to keep constant pressure on a guerrilla force. The AATF is suited for reconnaissance-in-force operations against conventional light infantry forces. However, it is not suited for such operations in a strong armor threat area due to the likelihood of ground contact with an enemy force that has superior firepower, mobility, and protection.

c. The reconnaissance in force accepts risk to gain intelligence information rapidly and in more detail than other reconnaissance methods. The commander assigning an AATF this mission must determine the following:

(1) Is the desired information important enough to justify the risks to personnel and equipment?

(2) Can other intelligence methods obtain the same information in sufficient time with less risk?

(3) Will the reconnaissance in force compromise future plans?

(4) Can the operation succeed?

d. The reconnaissance in force, however, differs from the normal attack that is conducted to destroy enemy forces or secure terrain. The reconnaissance in force locates the enemy and presses him into reacting. When the force discovers a weak point, the AATF exploits it quickly. The AATFC exercises caution, however, since the enemy response may be too strong for the AATF. Thus, the commander also plans withdrawal to avoid destruction of the AATF.

e. When the commander wants information about a particular area, the reconnaissance in force is planned and executed as an attack against a specific objective. The objective is of such importance that, when threatened, the enemy will react. For example: a successful reconnaissance in force may cause commitment of enemy reserves, redeployment of enemy fire support means, or adjustment of enemy second-echelon forces. Taking a terrain objective is not in itself the purpose of the operation. Rather, the operation seeks to obtain specific information about the enemy by seizing a terrain objective. The objective location depends on the information desired. The AATF's combat power must be sufficient to force enemy reaction. This should disclose positions, strength, planned fires, and planned use of reserves. It may also disrupt the enemy's planned operations and take the initiative from him. An AATFC can deploy all three companies against specific objectives; or the commander may commit one or two companies and retain the third to respond to tactical situations as they develop. When the enemy reacts to one unit, the units not in contact are shifted to exploit revealed enemy weaknesses or help extract a unit under pressure.

4-9. Raid.

a. Air assault raid. This is a swift penetration of hostile territory that may be conducted to destroy installations, confuse the enemy, or gather information. It ends with a planned withdrawal. Because a raid is conducted behind enemy lines, it requires exact planning to ensure a high probability of success. The selection of LZs, PZs, and flight routes (as in the deliberate attack) is based on the results of detailed planning and ample intelligence. Since the raiding force attempts to achieve surprise, the decision to land on the objective takes on added significance (Figure 4-2).

Figure 4-2. Operation of a raid.

(1) The AATF may land on or near the objective when the following applies:

(a) There is a suitable LZ.

(b) The enemy does not have a highly mobile reaction force nearby to attack the AATF immediately after it lands.

(c) The objective is not accessible overland.

(d) The AATFC determines that overland movement would expose his forces to enemy fire and possibly disrupt the mission.

(e) Surprise is important.

(f) When there are no armor or mechanized units and/or vehicles on the objective.

(g) When there are no air defense weapons on the objective.

(h) When the AATF can land overwhelming combat power quickly on the objective.

(2) The AATF should land some distance from the objective when these considerations apply:

(a) The AATFC decides to assemble and reorganize before conducting the assault.

(b) The only suitable LZs are away from the objective.

(c) There is a highly mobile enemy force on the objective that could disrupt the landing.

(d) Surprise is not imperative.

(e) Local air defense is too strong.

b. Conduct a raid. The AATFC task organizes his force to accomplish four essential tasks:

(1) Command and control.

(2) Security.

(3) Support.

(4) Assault.

(a) Command and control. The AATFC commands and controls from a location that offers the best vantage points; however, during air movement, the AATFC normally uses a command and control helicopter. After units are on the ground, he may join one of the ground units or he may continue to control from the air.

(b) Security. The element given the security mission blocks avenues of approach into the objective and provides suppressive fires for withdrawal after the mission is complete.

(c) Support. The element providing assault support lays down a heavy volume of suppressive fire to neutralize the objective and destroy the enemy that is occupying it.

(d) Assault. The element conducting the assault secures the objective and provides security for specialty teams (for example, demolitions).

c. Rehearsal. Rehearsals are critical to success. The operation should be rehearsed several times by all elements participating in the raid. If it is a night raid, rehearsals are conducted during daylight and darkness.

d. Withdrawal.

(1) A raid differs from other attacks in that it includes a withdrawal plan. The plan contains provisions for withdrawal by air as well as on foot (in case aircraft cannot extract the force). Withdrawal on foot may require the entire force to move as a unit, or the force may have to break down into small elements to evade enemy contact and exfiltrate the area.

(2) A withdrawal by air involves movement into, and defense of, the PZ (Figure 4-3). If the withdrawal is for the purpose of committing the force to another combat mission, then an additional ground tactical plan is prepared for that phase of operation. Either plan is as detailed as time permits and includes:

(a) Pickup zone designation.

(b) Fire support plan for movement to secure the PZ and to cover the withdrawal.

(c) Schedule of unit movement to the PZ.

(d) Loading priorities.

(e) Designation of, and instructions for, the PZ control group.

(f) Landing zone designation following withdrawal.

Figure 4-3. Example of a withdrawal by air.

e. Unit sequence. The sequence of unit withdrawal varies according to the tactical situation and the subsequent mission of the AATF. Administrative, combat service support personnel, and heavy equipment are withdrawn first (before tactical units). The commander may withdraw them to a secured (intermediate) area and then move them to another (combat) area after it is secured. Unit redeployment is determined by combat and security requirements in the new area.

f. Pickup zone designation.

(1) Pickup zones. They are designated by the headquarters controlling the withdrawal. PZs are as close to unit positions as the terrain and enemy situation permit. To achieve speed in landing, loading, and lift-off, multiple PZs may be used (consistent with available security forces).

(2) Pickup zone control officer. A PZCO is designated for each unit's PZ. He is responsible for calling units and guiding them from their assembly areas to the PZs to expedite loading. The senior PZCO coordinates all PZ operations when using multiple PZs (and PZCOS). He maintains contact with the AMC to ensure coordinated arrival of troops and aircraft.

(3) Security.

(a) Security elements are positioned to cover the main body as it assembles, moves to the PZ, and withdraws. Security may be composed of small detachments from each subordinate unit, or it may be one of the subordinate units. The latter is usually best. Unit integrity aids control and gives more effective reaction in case of attack. Security elements protect the PZ at a time ordered by the unit commander conducting the withdrawal.

(b) Each aircraft withdrawing the security force lands as close as possible to its individual load. During this short interval, attack helicopter teams overmatching the withdrawal provide security. Panels, or other covert markers, identify each loading site (when the withdrawal is conducted during limited visibility, chemical lights or directional beacons are used).

(c) The last security element to withdraw achieves some protection by detonating Claymore mines and firing automatic weapons just before loading. The loading and lift-off are executed quickly. Attack helicopter teams over-match the lift-off.

(4) Reserve. A reserve, when designated, may remain airborne near the PZ or on standby in another area. This gives the commander a reaction force that can be employed as required to support withdrawal of the security force.

(5) Fire support. During withdrawal, fire support is planned and executed to protect security elements as combat power on the PZ diminishes.

Defense:

4-10. General.

Defense is a coordinated effort by a force to defeat an attacker and prevent him from achieving his objectives (FM 100-5). Army doctrine does not describe the form of defense to be used in battle because there is literally an infinite number of defensive techniques that a commander can select from in developing a defense. The commander, by using the METT-T analysis, can determine the best technique for a specific tactical situation.

4-11. Defensive operations against an infantry-heavy threat.

a. Air assault task force defending. The AATF defends against an infantry-heavy Threat by employing its airmobility to achieve a maneuver advantage over the enemy. This advantage allows it to perform operations in the covering force area (CFA), main battle area (MBA), and rear area.

b. Covering force area. The AATF can conduct covering force operations for a larger force. Normally, the covering force consists of air reconnaissance, infantry, artillery, engineer, and attack helicopter units. Infantry and artillery assigned to the covering force must be provided enough helicopters to move the entire unit. The covering force is generally organized based on the:

(1) Number of enemy avenues of approach into the CFA.

(2) Size and type of enemy forces.

The covering force accomplishes its mission by placing the majority of its combat units on the most dangerous avenues of approach into the CFA. Air reconnaissance deploys to the front and provides early warning of the direction, speed, and composition of enemy forces. Enemy units are taken under fire as soon as they are within range of weapons. As the enemy attempts to close with ground units of the covering force, attack helicopters, artillery, and close air support provide firepower to enable ground units to displace by air to successive positions. Protection of air assault infantry and antitank systems is achieved by superior mobility. Covering force units attrite the enemy, deceive him as to the location of the MBA, slow his speed of advance, cause him to mass, and may cause him to divulge his intentions. Units are assigned subsequent missions in the MBA when the covering force mission has been accomplished.

c. Main battle area. The mobility advantage which the AATF has over enemy infantry-heavy units allows it to defend in greater depth. The AATF defends by orienting on the destruction of advancing enemy forces and fights a series of battles in depth, attacking the enemy from the front, flanks, and rear while using minimal forces to maintain surveillance over the remainder of the assigned sector. Battle positions are selected and prepared throughout the MBA along likely avenues of approach. Primary and alternate LZs and PZs are selected for each battle position. When enemy fires preclude extraction of the AATF from battle positions, covered and concealed routes are selected for foot movement to alternate PZs. Only when absolutely necessary should an AATF be directed to occupy or retain terrain. If there is a situation in which the retention of terrain is essential to the defense of the entire sector, its retention is specified.

4-12. Defensive operations against an armor-heavy threat.

a. Air assault task force defending. An AATF is not well-suited to perform a defensive operation against mounted forces on terrain favorable to mounted operations. However, the AATF can effectively operate in the restrictive terrain of built-up areas or mountains or defend chokepoints,

b. Types of operations. The AATF can conduct the following operations on the armored and mechanized battlefield in support of larger defensive operations:

(1) Main battle area operations in restrictive terrain.

(2) Economy of force or reserve.

(3) Rear operations.

(4) Flank security operations.

(5) Limited-objective counterattack operations or raids.

(6) Delay and withdrawal operations.

(7) Seizure of FLOT objectives for linkup operations.

c. Covering force area. Attack helicopter and air reconnaissance units are the elements best suited for employment in covering force operations when employed with armored and mechanized units.

d. Main battle area. The AATF is not well-suited to defend against armored and mechanized forces. If it is used to defend against such forces, it should be employed in restrictive terrain not favorable to employment of massed armor. The AATF can be employed in built-up areas, mountainous terrain, and heavily forested areas. Attack helicopters can be employed as a mobile, tank-killing reserve.

4-13. Economy of force.

Defense in an economy-of-force role can be accomplished by displacing units of the AATF in depth on the avenue of approach throughout the sector. The air reconnaissance elements can screen areas where enemy attack is possible but unlikely. Combat units are repositioned to counter the major enemy thrust. After engaging the enemy, and before the enemy closes on battle positions, units are picked up from designated PZs and organized in depth. The AATF essentially conducts a delay. Field artillery is repositioned as necessary to halt the enemy advance. Attack helicopter elements should be placed under the operational control of the AATFC. Elements of the AATF held in reserve are rapidly transported by helicopter into areas under enemy pressure.

4-14. Delay.

a. The key to success in the delay is the commander's ability to array forces in depth before the initiation of the delay. Decisive engagement is accepted only to the degree and extent necessary to accomplish the delay mission. Contingency plans for stay-behind operations should be developed. The AATFC should continually look for and seize the opportunity to launch small-scale offensive air assault and attack helicopter raids into the enemy flanks and rear areas. A delay may be conducted to:

(1) Gain time so that other forces can deploy.

(2) Serve as an economy-of-force measure to allow concentration of friendly forces in other areas.

(3) Determine enemy composition, strength, intentions, and capabilities.

(4) Channel the enemy into selected areas and then destroy him.

b. The AATF is seldom given a "timed-delay" mission. This type of mission would require an AATF to delay the enemy for a specified time and would restrict its mobility and subject it to unacceptable losses.

c. The delay-in-sector mission is more appropriate. The TF disengages by helicopter before it is decisively engaged. Against armor forces, the AATF should displace at distances of no less than 1,500 meters and rely on attack helicopters to delay the armor while friendly infantry is extracted.

Other Tactical Missions:

4-15. General.

This section discusses eight types of operations. Any one may be applicable in an air assault mission.

4-16. Screening.

a. An AATF screening force provides early warning over an extended frontage. Screening missions are assigned to:

(1) Provide timely warning of enemy approach.

(2) Maintain visual contact and report on movement.

(3) Destroy or repel small enemy forces by employing organic and/or supporting fires.

(4) Impede the advance of larger forces and destroy the enemy by employing long-range organic fires.

b. A screening mission employs a series of observation posts (OP) overlooking enemy avenues of approach and the areas between them. Patrols cover dead space between OPs and cover other areas during limited visibility. When contact is established, the screening force withdraws on order, maintaining visual and/or electronic contact, and reports enemy movements. As in the delay, timely displacement is critical to AATF survival.

4-17. Guard force.

The AATF can perform flank or rear guard missions for a division or larger force and help protect the main body from ground observation, direct fire, and surprise attack. As a guard force, it has sufficient combat power to attack enemy reconnaissance forces and to delay an enemy attack until the main body can deploy. The rear guard follows the main body, occupying successive positions. The rear guard also screens between flank positions and rear elements of the main body. The AATF conducts rear guard operations by moving from position to position. These movements are controlled by using designated phase lines.

4-18. Covering force.

The air reconnaissance squadron of the division can overfly rough terrain, find the enemy, and develop the situation. Brigades are deployed as necessary to ensure the uninterrupted movement of the main body. The brigade may use one of the following two methods to conduct the division covering force mission:

a. Reinforced air reconnaissance elements under divisional control reconnoiter while the air assault task force remains in assembly areas or on order to be available for commitment. When contact is made with the enemy, and after the air reconnaissance has developed the situation, AATFs are committed to destroy the enemy.

b. Brigades, with air cavalry elements under their operational control, conduct covering force operations as the division minus moves by bounds behind the leading brigade.

4-19. Reinforcement of committed units.

a. An AATF can reinforce a committed unit in three ways:

(1) With uncommitted units (reserves).

(2) With additional antitank (AD platoons.

(3) By moving field artillery to weight the battle.

b. Brigade commanders may direct the insertion of an AATF unit to reinforce threatened sectors or add depth to the battle area.

c. Antitank platoons may be taken from a reserve unit or a unit that is not protecting an armor approach. Depending on the number of sections employed, the AT platoon leader and/or the platoon sergeant accompanies them for command and control. Tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile sections are used for their long-range fires and accuracy. Careful consideration is given to planning the extraction of AT platoons because they lack ground mobility. An infantry squad may accompany each section to provide security. The unit receiving an AT section assumes responsibility for effective positioning, integrating their fires with other elements, and providing necessary support.

d. Firing batteries can be rapidly shifted about the air assault battlefield to ensure fire support to committed units.

4-20. Linkup operations.

a. When withdrawal of an AATF from the objective area is not planned or feasible, a linkup operation is conducted to join two forces. The AATF may participate as part of a larger force, or it may conduct a linkup with its own resources. Close coordination and detailed planning between the commanders of both units are essential. Some of the things that must be coordinated are:

(1) Command relationships. To delineate responsibilities, it is necessary to specify who assumes command upon linkup. The headquarters directing the linkup determines the command relationship, its effective time, and the responsibilities of each force during the operation.

(2) Liaison and responsibilities. Once command relationships are established, the commanders of the units involved establish liaison. If conditions permit, the commander and liaison teams meet face to face; if not, then coordination is accomplished by radio or other available means, such as messengers. During the operation, the units attempt to maintain continuous radio contact with each other or with higher headquarters. As a minimum, the units exchange the following information:

(a) Enemy and friendly situations.

(b) Locations and types of obstacles (natural and artificial).

(c) Fire support plan.

(d) Air defense control measures.

(e) Recognition signals.

(3) Mutual recognition signal system. A system of mutual recognition signals is established and made known to all units participating in the linkup. Provisions are made for recognition procedures that may be used both day and night for air and ground elements alike.

(4) Communications. It is the responsibility of the headquarters directing the linkup to ensure communications-electronics operation instructions compatibility. If the linking units do not have the same CEOI, the higher headquarters directs one unit to change. The unit to change is normally the one not in contact, encircled, or breaking out. This is especially critical for recognition signals. If the units involved in the operation are neither under OPCON nor attached, they maintain their parent command nets.

(5) Schemes of maneuver. Both units' schemes of maneuver, to include control measures, are exchanged. When a passage of lines is required after linkup, the control measures include primary and alternate linkup points, start points, routes, and release points.

(6) Fire support. Fire support coordination measures are established and disseminated to both forces by the headquarters ordering the linkup. A restrictive fire line (RFL) is normally established on identifiable terrain as close as possible to the stationary force. The RFL prohibits the fires and the effects of fires from extending across the line without coordination with the affected force. Each force must be prepared to support the other as the situation dictates. Upon linkup, or at some prearranged time, control of supporting fire becomes the responsibility of the commander previously designated to have overall responsibility for the operation. Since the maneuvering unit is normally larger and has more supporting weapons and more reliable supply lines than the stationary AATF, the maneuvering unit can provide more support than the stationary unit. However, the stationary unit, since it is already in position, can provide some support to the maneuvering unit. Such support is limited by the amount of ammunition and the number and type of weapons assigned to the stationary unit.

(7) Actions after linkup. These are specified in the order given to the units conducting linkup. This ensures operational continuity and reduces massing of units. Actions may include reinforcing the defense of the area, conducting a coordinated attack, or passing the maneuver unit through the stationary unit to continue the attack.

(8) Assistance. This includes the mutual assistance that the stationary and maneuvering units can provide to each other. Because of its lack of assets in the airhead, the stationary unit normally can provide only limited assistance to the maneuvering unit. The stationary unit, however, can normally provide the following:

(a) Guides.

(b) Lanes through obstacles and the airhead.

(c) Traffic control.

(d) Limited logistical and maintenance support.

(e) Limited medical support (for example: holding areas for, and possible evacuation of, dead and wounded).

(f) Limited fire support.

(g) Information on recent enemy activity.

The maneuvering unit normally provides more assistance because of its established lines of communications. However, if it experienced heavy combat during the move to the linkup, this assistance may be reduced. The maneuvering unit can normally provide logistical, maintenance, medical, and fire support.

(9) Alternate plan. An alternate plan is developed to cope with unexpected enemy activity.

b. Once the airhead is established, the linkup points are occupied. When the maneuvering unit is within range and identified, communications are established between it and the stationary unit. Once linkup is effected, the two units follow the procedures for a passage of lines, and they continue their assigned missions.

4-21. River crossing operations.

AATFs by their makeup, may reduce CSS considerations during river crossing operations. Such forces may overfly the river or support bridge construction. Reconnaissance elements can be deployed by air to verify and collect essential intelligence on crossing sites and enemy dispositions. Objectives can be reached on the far shore quickly, eliminating enemy interference with development and use of crossing sites. Engineer bridging assets can be airlifted forward rapidly, eliminating traffic problems on the crossing site approaches. If a deliberate crossing is chosen, the AATF, with its increased mobility, can be used to clear the near shore of enemy resistance. During the actual crossing, whether it be hasty or deliberate, the AATF can assist by:

a. Attacking enemy forces that interfere with the crossing by seizing objectives thatwould secure, or assist in securing, the bridgehead.

b. Providing flank security.

c. Securing crossing sites.

d. Screening the crossing sites with smoke.

4-22. Rear operations.

a. Countering enemy airmobile, airborne, or guerrilla infiltration threats, the AATF monitors likely infiltration routes and probable target areas for airborne or airmobile attacks. Probable LZs and PZs are identified and monitored by observation posts or remote sensors. Potential infiltration routes in unoccupied terrain are monitored with sensors to detect the enemy as early as possible.

b. Air reconnaissance units provide wide-area surveillance and security, and are integrated into reaction force plans.

c. Rear operations are coordinated with designated military police, civil affairs groups, and other civil and military organizations. The AATF, as the initial reaction force, contains the enemy force if it does not have enough combat powers to destroy it, and relies on additional forces to destroy the enemy.

4-23. Limited visibility operations.

a. A commander may desire to take advantage of limited visibility conditions to gain maximum surprise or deception, maintain the momentum of successful operations, reinforce or withdraw committed units, and/or deploy maneuver support elements.

b. The following aircraft operational requirements must be considered:

(1) Desired directions) and route(s) of movement for aircraft (to include identification of selected terrain feature).

(2) The identity and location of LZs and/or PZs.

(3) Emergency ground-to-air signals.

(4) Directions and points of landing for aircraft.

(5) The presence of LZ obstacles is indicated to the aircraft flight commanders through electronic and/or visual navigation aids.

c. Some advantages of limited visibility operations are:

(1) Aircraft are partially concealed from enemy visual observation.

(2) Maximum surprise and confusion can be achieved.

(3) Continuous pressure can be exerted on the enemy.

(4) Effective enemy air defense fire, and interdiction by enemy aircraft, are diminished.

d. Disadvantages of limited visibility operations also exist. The need for more elaborate control measures and caution on the part of the aviators and troops slow operations. However, with proper equipment, constant training, and a thorough knowledge of techniques, these disadvantages may be overcome. The following factors are considered:

(1) More time is required for planning, preparation, and execution.

(2) Formation flight is more difficult, and formations are more dispersed.

(3) LZs and/or PZs used should be larger.

(4) Navigation is more difficult.

(5) Additional illumination is planned and immediately available to the AATFC in case it is necessary for mission accomplishment.

4-24. Operations in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment.

a. In the event of a nuclear attack, AATFs can conduct a radiological survey and, when feasible, move into the target area after the explosion to stall enemy exploitation of its effect. AATFs can rapidly and safely bypass obstacles created by a nuclear strike, whether their objective is within or beyond the target area.

b. When planning air assault operations in conjunction with friendly nuclear munitions employment, the planner must consider:

(1) Effects of intense light on pilot vision.

(2) Effects of intense heat on equipment and personnel.

(3) Effects of blast waves on aircraft in flight.

(4) Residual radiation rates on the LZs.

(5) Utilization of LZs; debris may prohibit their use.

(6) Effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) on electronic equipment.

(7) Selection of approach and departure routes into contaminated LZs.

(8) Use of alternate LZs when primary LZs are judged as having too high a residual radiation rate.

c. Planning for air assault operations in a toxic environment includes consideration of the following:

(1) Reconnaissance of areas known or suspected of contamination.

(2) Selection of routes and positions with regard to contaminated areas to avoid stirring up or spreading agents with rotor wash.

(3) Protection of supplies and equipment.

d. The three principles of NBC operations (contamination avoidance, protection, and decontamination) are fundamentals that ensure survival (see FMs 3-3, 3-4, and 3-5).

e. If air assault operations must be conducted following contamination, the AATFC may direct that hasty (spot) decontamination of aircraft be accomplished. Spot decontamination is an effective means of decontaminating specific areas of an aircraft. This sustains flight operation since certain functional areas are treated before they are touched. Surfaces must be washed with decontaminants to flush agents off the aircraft skin. Small amounts of the NBC agent (absorbed into the fuselage paint) will probably remain after decontaminating. The evaporation of these residues can create a vapor hazard; therefore, personnel in and around the aircraft continue to wear the protective mask and gloves. Decontamination reduces the hazard of agent contact and transfer. Six functional areas applicable to spot decontamination are:

(1) Refueling procedures.

(2) Rearming procedures.

(3) Entry and exit from the aircraft.

(4) Preflight and postflight inspections.

(5) Maintenance inspections.

(6) Battle damage repair.

Aviation personnel are trained in spot-decontamination procedures but may require equipment to effect all required decontamination quickly.

Combined Arms Team:

5- 1. General.

The air assault task force commander uses combat support elements to enhance the combat power of his maneuver elements. Knowing combat support capabilities, assigning them appropriate missions, and controlling their operations are essential to the application of superior combat power at the decisive time and place. The AATFC's key role in integrating combat support elements with his maneuver elements, to form the combined arms team, is critical for success in the AirLand Battle.

5-2. Employment of combat support.

a. Combat support elements. They are normally under OPCON or in DS of the AATF in order to ensure the close coordination and continuous, dedicated support required in air assault operations.

b. Determining task organization. The AATFC assigns an element that is attached, under OPCON, or in DS, to one of his subordinate maneuver units when he feels the element could be more effectively controlled or employed by one particular unit, rather than under AATF control. General support is used when the combat support element can best support the operation under centralized control to quickly shift its efforts to the point needed (for example, mortars that are normally used in a general;support role) and when the situation is vague or changing.

c. Basic responsibility to support, No matter what support status the combat support elements are assigned, the AATFC has the responsibility to ensure the combat support units are properly supported by the AATF. Although the AATFC is not required to provide support under the status of DS, GS, or OPCON, it is to his advantage to ensure the CS elements are properly supported. This means providing rations, fuel, and ammunition as required. It also means expediting repair of equipment outside the capabilities of the AATF maintenance unit, The advantage of doing this is to ensure the CS elements are able to continue providing support.

d. Relationship to the AATF staff. The commander of the combat support unit must be both a commander and a special staff officer. This means he commands his unit and provides advice and assistance to the AATFC. He serves as a special staff officer during the planning phase of an operation, providing assistance and advice in the preparation of the operation order. He can also provide advice and assistance during the conduct of the operation, but this is limited since his primary concern is command of his unit.

Fire Support:

5-3. General.

a. Fire support is the collective and coordinated employment of mortars, field artillery, attack helicopters, close air support, naval gunfire, and other fires in support of battle plans. The mission of the fire support system is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress surface targets in support of air assault operations. It includes suppression of enemy air defenses which is imperative for air assault operations.

b. The AATFC integrates the firepower of mortars, field artillery, close air support, EW, and, when available, naval gunfire, with the maneuver of combat units to defeat the enemy. Fire support enhances the AATF's combat power by:

(1) Destroying, suppressing, and neutralizing targets.

(2) Obscuring the vision of enemy forces.

(3) Isolating enemy formations and positions.

(4) Slowing and canalizing enemy movements.

(5) Killing or disabling the enemy at ranges greater than that of direct fire weapons.

(6) Screening with smoke or creating obstacle areas with the employment of scatterable mines.

(7) Reducing the effects of enemy artillery by active counterfire.

(8) Interdicting follow-on enemy echelons.

(9) Providing illumination.

c. To effectively utilize the fire support assets, the AATFC must have an understanding of the field artillery support relationship. The artillery force commander is the fire support coordinator for the AATF, and the fire support officer is the assistant FSCOORD. Each AATF is provided a fire support element, led by an FSO, from the direct support battalion. In those instances when the AATF is operating independently, it may be necessary to attach an artillery unit (battery or battalion) to provide adequate fire support. Attachment is a nonstandard mission and involves special considerations for the AATF, such as the responsibility to provide security, logistical support, and lift capability to the artillery unit.

d. Fire support planning techniques and measures specific to air assault operations are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4.

e. Appendix F includes a discussion of specialized training required for support of air assault operations.

5-4. The fire support coordinator.

While the AATFC is responsible for the integration of all fires with the maneuver plan, the FSCOORD is his principal assistant for the proper integration and application of fire support. Working together as a team, the supported commander and the FSCOORD generate the maximum combat power available to support the ground forces.

5-5. Fire support delivery systems.

The AATF is unique in its mission and organization and so are its support elements. They are specifically tailored to be integrated into the AATF. The indirect fire assets must be light and maneuverable and capable of maintaining the fast pace of the AATF. The fire support delivery means available to the AATF may include:

a. Mortars. Organic to each infantry battalion, they are used to provide close-in direct fire support.

b. Artillery. Supporting artillery must either be positioned well forward to provide fires from the PZ to the objective area, or must be air lifted with the AATF to the objective area.

c. Air defense artillery. Supporting air defense artillery can be called upon to provide direct fire support when the situation demands and the commander so directs.

d. Close air support. In most cases, United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft will be available to provide close air support. Requests for these aircraft are processed through the TAC CP collocated with the AATF.

e. Naval gunfire. Navy cruisers and destroyers provide fire support in coastal areas. Naval gunfire spotters from a United States Marine Corps (USMC) air and naval gunfire liaison company (ANGLICO) may be attached to the AATF to control these fires.

f. Attack helicopters. Because of their mobility and firepower, attack helicopters may be integrated into the fire support plan when conventional field artillery is not available.

Fire Support Planning and Coordination:

5-6. General.

a. Fire support planning addresses how fire support is to be used to support maneuver forces. Fire support coordination entails those actions needed to implement plans and manage resources on the battlefield. Although planning and coordination are separated, they overlap and are mutually supporting. If the planning has been done well, the implementation (coordination) will give the commander the support he needs to win. For a discussion of fire support planning and coordination, see Chapter 3, FM 6-20.

b. The planning and coordination process begins when the mission is received or assumed. The AATFC, S3, and the FSO interact throughout the planning sequence, the decision process, and the execution of the mission.

5-7. Facilities.

At the AATF level, the FSO advises the AATFC on how fire support can best influence the operation. He performs the planning and coordination of fire support assets to include mortars, field artillery, close air support, and naval gunfire. The fire support element (FSE) and fire support team (FIST) provide personnel for continuous planning and coordination of support fires.

a. AATF fire support element. The fire support element at each AATF (battalion-size) consists of an FSO, assistant FSO, fire support sergeant, and fire support specialists. The FSE, AATF S3 Air, and advisers from the other fire support means are collocated within the AATF TOC for the planning and coordination of fire support. The FSE coordinates and works closely with the brigade FSE, and FSEs of other battalions, the DS field artillery battalion fire direction center (FDC), and S2 and S3, the tactical air control party, aviation liaison officer, S3 Air, the mortar platoon leader, engineer platoon leader, and the company fire support teams. The FSO supervises the operations of the FISTS.

b. Company fire support team. The company fire support team and the forward observer (FO) section provide the fire support planning and coordination for maneuver companies and platoons. The FISTs are provided by the DS FA battalion. Occasionally, firepower control teams for naval gunfire (NGIN and naval air, and forward air controllers for USAF CAS collocate at the company FIST to advise and assist in the use of their assets. The FIST is supervised by an FA lieutenant who serves as the company commander's fire support officer.

5-8. Fire support planning.

The planning process determines how fire support will be used: what types of targets will be attacked, when, and with what means. It is sufficiently flexible to accommodate the unexpected in combat. Integrated fire support can result only when the FSCOORD is an aggressive contributor to the AATFC's planning sequence and decision making process.

a. The depth and detail of fire support planning depend on how much time is available. Many of the actions that occur in response to battle situations are established in SOPs and in fragmentary orders (FRAGO).

b. Fire support planning is continuous and concurrent at all levels. During the battle, planning is concurrent with fire support coordination to implement the fire support plan on the battlefield.

c. The fire support plan outlines the way artillery, mortars, close air support, and naval gunfire are used to complement the scheme of maneuver, and provides instructions for executing those fires. It also details the use of AATF target acquisition assets. It prioritizes targets, matches them with the available fire support systems, and allows fires to be executed quickly (without specific direction from the commander) once the operation starts. An AATF fire support plan should include:

(1) A detailed concept of how fires support the air assault operation from the initial PZ to the final objective.

(2) A target list that includes locations where fires are expected or likely to be used.

(3) A priority of fires telling which element receives fire in case of conflict (for example, priority of FA fires to Team A; mortar fires to Team B).

(4) Target attack priorities establishing which type of mission to fire first in case of conflict (for example, first priority to enemy air defense systems; second priority to assist disengagements).

(5) An allocation of priority targets to indirect fire assets, if designated.

(6) Firing schedules for the indirect fire weapon systems. This planning tool identifies who fires the mission, when it occurs, and the nature of fires (for example, family of scatterable mines, smoke, SEAD preparations).

(7) Informal airspace coordination areas (ACA).

(8) Coordination measures for providing troop safety and promoting synchronization of supporting fires.

d. During the planning of fire support for an air assault operation, the FSO must consider displacement. When FA can support the AATF from a secure area (without displacement forward of the forward edge of the battle area [FEBA]), it does so. If such support is not feasible, the FSO determines if other fire support is sufficient to accomplish the mission. If other support is not sufficient, it may be necessary to displace the FA into the objective area. When the decision to displace is made, consider that:

(1) Displacement is accomplished by echelon to prevent temporary loss of FA support.

(2) Field artillery requires security in the objective area.

(3) Cargo helicopters are required to displace the FA unit.

(4) Ammunition resupply is made by air.

(5) The FA depends on helicopter assets for mobility unless prime movers are lifted into the objective area.

(6) Supporting, towed artillery (M198 or lighter) must be available.

e. The fire support plan is developed by the FSO with assistance and input from the Air Force LO, FISTS, heavy mortar platoon leader, S2, and S3. A fire plan is constantly refined or modified as the operation continues. Thus, the fire support plan facilitates responsive fires to the AATF wherever they are needed.

f. A formal and/or informal planning approach at the AATF level is a combined process that uses the principles of both formal (downward) and informal (upward) planning. Initially, the AATF FSO disseminates, in the operation order, a fire support plan to support the AATF. This product usually contains all the elements listed above. The FSO plan is modified as company and/or FIST fire plans are received. The rewritten fire plan is disseminated to each weapon system for execution.

g. To facilitate fire planning, company FSOs normally accompany team commanders to the AATF OPORD briefing. This permits the company FSOs to hear the operational concept simultaneously with their commander. Within minutes after the OPORD, they can get together to develop their fire support plans. This arrangement also allows the AATF FSO to brief the company FSOS on plans the AATFC wants implemented. Written fire plans can be disseminated. Questions can be answered quickly and conflicts can be resolved with minimum confusion.

h. Suppression of enemy air defense is a critical task in fire support to ensure success of the air assault operation and must be planned. Lift helicopters are especially vulnerable to enemy air defenses. Unless there are overriding tactical considerations, enemy air defense is always suppressed. The AATF FSO ensures that all flight routes and suspected enemy ADA sites are targeted with preplanned fires. Suppression of enemy air defense may be executed either as scheduled fires based upon a specific time schedule, or may be fired "on call," based upon the movement of the AATF through predetermined zones or across predetermined phase lines. The FSO is normally located with the AATFC and requires a dedicated fire direction net; he will control the lifting and/or shifting of SEAD fires as directed by the AATFC. Attack helicopter elements providing air assault security will suppress enemy ADA encountered en route. The attack battle team captain should select overmatch positions or fly escort along the flight route to provide immediate suppressive fires. For a complete discussion of these techniques, see FM 6-20.

i. The fire support plan may include any of the following categories of fire designed to complement the AATFC's operation:

(1) Planned fires on known or suspected enemy locations, avenues of approach, supply routes, and suspected weapons locations.

(2) On-call fires (prearranged fires that are requested).

(3) Preparations.

(4) Counterpreparations.

(5) Counterfires.

(6) Artillery delivered smoke (obscuration or screening).

(7) Illumination.

(8) Suppression fire.

(9) Scatterable mines (FASCAM can be delivered only when 155-mm howitzer systems are available to the AATF).

5-9. Coordination.

a. Effective fire support depends on decentralized execution and coordination. Based upon the AATFC's intent for using fire support, the FSO and FISTs execute the plan during the operation with minimum specific instruction. The FSO's coordination includes all actions required to make the plan work. He:

(1) Ensures the DS battalion FDC, the mortar platoon FDC, and any other supporting elements have the correct fire support plan and understand their portion of it.

(2) Verifies that the AATF mortars are in position to support, if available and required.

(3) Keeps fire support representatives at higher headquarters and the supporting field artillery TOC informed of the current tactical situation.

(4) Selects fire support means to attack targets during the operation.

(5) Keeps the AATF commander and S3 informed of the current status of fire support means available to the AATF.

(6) Recommends modifications of the fire support plan (during the operation) to react to battlefield changes, and ensures FISTs are aware of changes.

(7) Recommends, to the AATFC and/or S3, fire support coordinating measures to facilitate the attack of targets or to provide troop safety.

(8) Coordinates requests for additional fire support with higher level fire elements.

(9) Monitors execution of the fire support plan.

b. The FSO ensures that the plan developed remains supportable and must immediately inform the AATFC if there is not enough fire support allocated to make the plan work, or if changes are dictated in the plan. To do this, he is forward with the command group during the conduct of the operation. He normally flies with the AATFC when a C2 helicopter is used.

c. The FSO keeps abreast of the tactical situation and coordinates all fire support impacting in his zone, including that requested by the AATF. He ensures that fires do not jeopardize troop safety, interfere with other fire support means, or disrupt adjacent unit operations. In this coordination, the FSO can utilize fire support coordinating measures.

d. During the conduct of the operation, shifts in priorities of fire, changes to the fire plan to support a changed scheme of maneuver, and immediate CAS are all handled forward by the FSO and ALO with the command group. The FSE at the TOC continues its planning responsibilities and provides backup support to the command group.

e. TheFSO, in conjunction with the S3 Air, coordinates the fire control activities of the air assault task force (Figure 5-1).

Figure 5-1. Fire control net.

f. All aviators are trained to call for and adjust indirect fires.Air reconnaissance or attack helicopter unit Aero-Scouts may be particularly valuable in assisting the AATFC and the FSO in coordinating or adjusting indirect fires because they are normally in the best position to see the battlefield.

Artillery Air Assault Operations:

5-10. General.

The AATF fights both offensive and defensive battles. Its organizational tactics, emphasizing aerial mobility and flexibility, require special planning considerations for employment. As discussed in Section III, the FSCOORD plans (with the AATFC) to support the ground tactical plan. In planning to support the air assault operations, the FSCOORD considers:

a. Range for artillery and other fire support systems. With the extended distances anticipated, the challenge for the FSCOORD is to position fire support systems so that they can range (place fire) and mass (concentrate fire) on targets within the AATF area of operations. When the AATF must operate out of artillery range, there is a greater dependence on CAS, attack helicopters, and mortars.

b. Importance of the target. Artillery is positioned to range those targets considered critical to the maneuver commander. For high value targets, the commander and the FSCOORD may consider moving artillery by helicopter to strike deep in the enemy's rear by firing across-FLOT raids or displacing laterally in sector.

c. Airlift assets. The mobility of the 105-mm direct support artillery battalion is one of its major characteristics. In taking advantage of its mobility to weight the operation, the commander must consider the cost of aircraft assets. To reposition the firepower of the DS battalion by air will normally require one aircraft (UH-60 or CH-47) per howitzer. The CH-47D can slingload two or more M1028 simultaneously. Additional aircraft must be committed to movement of vehicles and supplies necessary to support the mission.

d. Risk in crossing lines. A major consideration in planning air assault artillery operations is the risk in crossing enemy lines. The value of the target is weighed against the chances of survivability. Once the risk of crossing lines is considered, the FSCOORD must evaluate the survivability of the unit on the ground and during extraction.

e. Target location. For air assault operations, accurate LZ and target locations are essential. Accuracy of locations determines accuracy of fires and often targets will be engaged with unobserved fires.

f. Pickup zone and/or landing zone. Artillery displacements require PZs and LZs large enough to position equipment. When the unit arrives at the LZ, it must be secured and capable of supporting the unit that will most likely use the LZ as a firing point.

g. Ammunition. The amount of ammunition to be made available has a major impact on artillery support. When planning indirect fire support, the FSCOORD must consider the amount of ammunition required and the availability of transportation assets. Artillery ammunition supply operations will place a significant burden on aviation assets available to the AATF.

h. Communications. In the employment of field artillery, the ability to maintain communications is a requirement. The supporting unit must be within radio range of the supported unit to receive the call for fire (this is of particular concern when positioning the M198 with its maximum range of 30 kilometers). Unless unavoidable, the firing batteries must be within communications range of their parent battalion.

i. Security. The AATF artillery must rely on either terrain positioning or attachment of infantry to provide for security. The need for security forces is essential when FA units accompany the AATF across-FLOT.

5-11. Capabilities.

The artillery supporting the AATF should be organized with capabilities to match the needs peculiar to air assault operations.

a. The type of howitzer likely to participate in air assault operations is the towed 105-mm howitzer. Characteristics of the weapon, and 105-mm-equipped units, are listed below:

(1) Responsive. Capable of a high rate of fire.

(2) Lightweight. Capable of external slingload by the UH-60 and CH-47 helicopters.

(3) Easily sustainable. Towed artillery is less prone to downtime because it is not tied to a self-propelled carriage. It has reduced logistics requirements for a prescribed load list (PLL) and petroleum, oil, lubricants (POL) than self-propelled artillery.

(4) Lack of crew protection. The crews of towed howitzer batteries are especially vulnerable to direct and indirect fire. With no armor protection, the battery can expect heavy losses if engaged by the enemy.

(5) Position security. The mission of the field artillery is to provide indirect fires. FA is not designed with the capability to defend itself against a significant threat that may be encountered in across-FLOT air assault operations.

(6) Limited range. The 105-mm howitzer has a maximum range of 11,500 meters (15,100 with rocket assisted projectiles). The AATF can rapidly outdistance its supporting artillery.

(7) Caliber. The 105-mm howitzer is the smallest caliber howitzer in the Army inventory with a shell-burst radius of 35 meters.

(8) Ammunition. The 105-mm howitzer is limited to conventional munitions (high explosive [HE], illumination [ILLUM], improved conventional munitions [ICM], white phosphorus [WP], smoke [HC]) with limited chemical capability. The FASCAM is not available except to 155-mm howitzer equipped units.

b. TheMI98howitzermayalsobeavailableforsupportofairassaultoperations.1t is a 155-mm towed howitzer with a maximum range of 18,100 meters (30,000 meters with rocket assisted projectiles [RAP]). The M198 is movable by CH-47 C&D model aircraft. The 155-mm has a greater versatility in ammunition (HE, ILLUM, ICM, WP, HC, remote antiarmor mine system [RAAMS], area denial artillery munition [ADAM], dual-purpose improved conventional munitions [DPICM], chemical, nuclear [NUC]) with a bursting radius of 50 meters.

Naval Gunfire Support:

5-12. General.

When operating near a coastline, naval gunfire support may be available to the AATF. Naval guns can provide high-volume, long-range, and accurate fires employing a variety of ammunition.

5-l3. Air and naval gunfire liaison company.

The ANGLICO provides ship-to-shore communications and fire control teams to adjust fire. In the absence of ANGLICO fire control teams, the AATF FISTS, aerial field artillery forward observers, or attack helicopter unit aeroscouts, may call for and adjust fires through the AATF ANGLICO team. See Appendix F, FM 6-20 for discussion for naval gunfire support.

United States Air Force Tactical Air Support:

5-14. General.

The USAF support for the AATF normally includes tactical air reconnaissance, close air support, and tactical airlift. The AATF staff, in coordination with the air liaison officer, plans, integrates, and coordinates the Air Force support for air assault operations. Requests for air support are processed and discussed in Appendix E, FM 6-20.

5-15. Joint air attack team.

a. The joint attack air team (JAAT) is a combination of US Army attack helicopters and US Air Force close support aircraft (normally A-10 jet tactical aircraft) operating together to locate and attack high priority, lucrative targets. The JAAT normally operates in concert with field artillery or mortars, air defense artillery, and ground maneuver forces. Information flowing between the AATFC, the attack helicopter team leader, and the forward air controller (FAC) optimizes the effectiveness of attack helicopter teams and attack fighter flights in destroying the enemy force.

b. The JAAT can provide the AATFC with a highly mobile, extremely lethal tank-killing force capable of engaging enemy forces beyond the range of other antitank weapons. The JAAT can destroy or disrupt enemy formations and provide vital intelligence about enemy strengths and locations. By simultane ously employing attack helicopters and A-10s against the same target array at the same time, the AATFC increases the lethality and survivability of both systems.

c. When a JAAT is approved and is in direct support of an AATF, it is controlled by the AATFC. Otherwise, it is controlled by the attack helicopter commander or team leader who reports to brigade headquarters.

Air Defense:

5-16. General.

In the mid- to high-intensity environments, air assault operations normally require either local air parity or local air superiority. Since the number and type of air defense systems that can accompany the AATF is limited, and because helicopters are vulnerable to attacking aircraft, a great reliance must be placed on friendly air forces for air defense protection. Additionally, the AATF must optimize the employment of organic air defense weapons and maximize the use of passive defense measures.

5-17. Air defense standard tactical missions.

a. Air defense artillery unit missions are assigned using ADA standard tactical missions. These missions are much like those assigned the field artillery (to include support responsibilities for an ADA unit). They also establish support relationships to the supported unit or to another ADA unit.

b. The missions are general support, general support-reinforcing, reinforcing, and direct support. However, an AATF normally receives an ADA element in DS for close and continuous support. The ADA unit leader positions his weapons as necessary to properly support the AATF. The ADA may be attached, for movement, to infantry in order to facilitate control and security.

5-18. Air defense system.

Air defense protection for the AATF (within friendly lines) is provided by TACAIR and all elements of the ADA systems (Hawk, Patriot, Chaparral, Vulcan, Redeye, and Stinger). When the AATF penetrates enemy-held territory, air defense comes from ADA assets that can be displaced by helicopter. Due to weight restrictions, air defense forward of the FEBA is limited to organic Redeyes, Stingers, and Vulcans (towed). Although the towed Vulcan can be moved by UH-60, the prime mover must be displaced by CH-47. The Vulcan battalion has FM radios, and due to the extended distances between the Vulcan battery command post and the platoon elements (when it is attached to the AATF), the battery may require long-range AATF communication facilities.

5-19. Control and communications.

Air defense fire is controlled using the rules of engagement (determining type of aircraft and whether it is friend or foe) and weapons control status established by higher headquarters. Team leaders are responsible for deciding whether an aircraft is hostile or friendly. Weapons control status describes the relative degree with which the fires of air defense (AD) systems are managed. They are:

a. Weapons free. They may fire at aircraft not positively identified as friendly.

b. Weapons tight. They fire only at aircraft positively identified as hostile according to announced hostile criteria.

c. Weapons hold. They do not fire except in self defense or in response to formal orders.

5-20. Air defense priorities.

a. Priorities for air defense within the AATF are established by the AATFC. The senior air defense officer provides advice and makes recommendations based on his analysis of his area of operations to include the terrain, the high performance aircraft, attack helicopter avenues of approach, and all of the assets within his area of operations. The AATFC determines his priorities based upon:

(1) The AATF mission.

(2) How critical the asset or unit is to the accomplishment of the AATF mission.

(3) How vulnerable the target is to air attack.

(4) How quickly it can resume operations after it has been attacked.

(5) The enemy's ability to attack the asset.

(6) Coverage provided by other air defense systems.

b. Air defense priorities must be established for all periods to include before and after an operation, and would typically include protection for:

(1) Helicopter laager and assembly areas.

(2) Helicopter refueling and rearming points.

Engineer Support:

5-21. General.

Combat engineers are an integral part of the combined arms team. Engineers possess the skills and equipment necessary to enhance friendly mobility and survivability, to counter the mobility of opposing forces, and to accomplish general engineer work. The engineers provide technical expertise and special equipment; the maneuver unit normally provides the required manpower.

a. Categories of support. Combat engineers provide four categories of support: mobility, countermobility, survivability, and general engineering.

(1) Mobility. Engineers reduce or eliminate the effects of obstacles to improve movement of maneuver forces and critical supplies. In support of air assault operations, engineers assist mobility by constricting or expanding helicopter LZs, FARPS, low altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES), and landing strips, and by maintaining, repairing, and rehabilitating existing forward aviation maintenance sites.

(2) Countermobility. Engineers construct obstacles to reinforce terrain to delay, disrupt, and kill the enemy. Countermobility increases time for target acquisition and maximizes the effectiveness of direct and indirect fire systems.

(3) Survivability. This involves protective position development: developing earth berms, dug-in positions, and overhead protection to reduce the effectiveness of enemy fire. In air assault operations, this could include protection of aircraft and fuel facilities.

(4) General engineering. These engineer missions do not directly contribute to the mobility, countermobility, and survivability of committed maneuver units. They are, however, essential for logistic support to include construction, improvement, and maintenance of rear area airfields.

b. Command and support relationships. The preferred engineer support relationship is DS; however, to conduct the air assault, engineers should be attached for movement only. During movement, engineers should be organized into squad-size elements and integrated into the air movement of infantry units. Once the movement is completed, the engineers should revert to DS and be task-organized no lower than platoon level.

5-22. Employment of engineer assets.

a. Engineer allocation to the brigade depends on METT-T, but will commonly be one company from the divisional combat engineer battalion. When requirements exceed the capabilities of one company, additional resources from either the division engineer battalion or support corps engineer units may be made available.

b. At the task force level, the number of engineer personnel and their relationship (to the TF) is dependent on METT-T. Even if no support relationship is established, engineers may have assigned missions in the AATF area and coordination must be maintained. This coordination is best effected by detailing an officer and a noncommissioned officer (NCO) from the supporting engineer company to the AATF for the duration of the operation.

c. How to use available assets is an important planning function.

(1) Plan and prioritize. The use of a scarce resource, such as combat engineers, must be carefully planned. The AATF engineer is part of the planning process from the beginning. The AATFC, S3, and the engineer work together to plan the use of the engineer assets and establish priorities. The engineer then advises the commander on how best to utilize assets based on time, personnel, equipment, and munitions available. A clear list of priority tasks is determined based on the AATFC's guidance and the engineer's recommendation.

(2) Integrate. The AATF commander ensures that the engineer effort is integrated into the scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. Fires, both direct and indirect, are planned to cover all obstacles. An obstacle placed where it cannot be covered by fire is a wasted effort. Therefore, the S3 ensures that he includes the FSO and engineer together in his planning effort. In addition, the AATFC and S3 direct the integration of AATF personnel into the accomplishment of all engineer work. Engineer assets must be placed well forward in the scheme of maneuver to assist the mobility of maneuver forces in the critical, early stages of attack.

(3) Control. The AATFC supervises the accomplishment of the engineer's mission as he prioritized it. Changes in the situation may require changes in the priority of engineer work and the AATFC and/or S3 communicate such changes to the engineer.

(4) Support. Mobility, countermobility, and survivability tasks are the responsibility of the AATF, not the engineer. While the engineer unit will provide much of the manpower allocated to these functions, use of other elements is normal. An example is the use of infantry to construct obstacles under the supervision of an engineer. To allow all engineer assets to be used for engineer tasks, AATF combat elements usually provide security for the engineers. The CSS for the engineer unit is provided by the parent engineer unit, except when engineers are attached. Regardless of the command and support relationship, the AATF provides Class IV and Class V stores to support its engineer operations.

(5) Execute. The engineers accomplish their mission in support of the AATFC's scheme of maneuver.

d. Special considerations involve heavy equipment found in engineer battalions, other than air assault or airborne units, which is generally too heavy to be air assaulted. Plans must be made to link up with the equipment later in the operation. If air movable heavy equipment is available to the AATF, their capability is greatly increased; however, resupply of diesel fuel becomes an important planning consideration. Another consideration is the special equipment necessary to slingload engineer equipment (chain leg sets and A-22 bags). This equipment is not normally available from the aviation units but will be provided by the engineer units possessing air movable heavy equipment. When air movable heavy equipment is not available, engineers must be prepared to construct obstacles, barriers, and assist with survivability tasks, by employing hand tools, explosives, and field expedient methods.

Planning:

6-1. General.

Combat service support for air assault operations must be planned, organized, and executed to support a rapid tempo in highly mobile and widely dispersed operations. The traditional doctrinal distances and responsiblities do not always apply to air assault operations. The air assault logistical planner must recognize this from the outset and be prepared to adapt and innovate with the resources at hand. Just as the AATF is tailored for combat operations by air, the logistical system must be tailored to support by air and is therefore dependent upon considerable outside support.

6-2. Air assault task force S4.

a. It is imperative that the AATF S4 be involved in the planning of air assault operations from the initial stages onward. This ensures that all facets and constraints of logistical support are considered, and provides the lead time necessary to organize and position those units and resources that are required to support the mission.

b. The S4 and the S3 must coordinate closely and continuously throughout any air assault operation. Both must share the same resource for moving combat power and sustaining assets - the helicopter.

c. To organize CSS for air assault operations, the logistical planner must know:

(1) The task force mission.

(2) The concept and duration of the operation.

(3) The task organization to include densities of-

(a) Personnel.

(b) Weapon systems by type.

(c) Equipment by type.

(d) Aircraft by type.

d. He must also consider the impact of the following:

(1) Enemy situation.

(2) Weather.

(3) Terrain.

(4) Reliance on air lines of communications.

(5) Great distances between supporting and supported units.

(6) Large ammunition and aviation fuel consumption rates.

e. The prudent air assault logistical planner will ensure that CSS is provided, not only for his organic and attached elements, but also for DS or OPCON units. Although the AATF does not have the inherent responsibility for CSS to OPCON, DS, or GS units, it does have the responsibility to ensure that CSS is coordinated for the supporting unit(s). The coordination expressly designates who provides CSS throughout the operation. When a large attachment joins the AATF, the attachment should bring appropriate amounts of its own CSS assets from its parent unit. These assets are controlled by the AATF administrative logistics center to provide coordinated CSS to the attached unit.

Combat Service Support Organization:

6-3. General.

a. The AATF is supported by both organic and external elements organized to push supplies, materiel, fuel, and ammunition forward by air.

b. A brigade-size AATF must rely on the forward area support team (FAST) or the forward support battalion (FSB) to support the operation. When the AATF is organized around an infantry battalion nucleus, a task-organized forward service support element may be dedicated to supporting the air assault operation.

c. A battalion AATF FSSE would typically consist of.-

(1) Medical support - a light shocks section.

(2) Maintenance contact teams for communications, automotive, armament, and recovery.

(3) Class III (ground) and Class V support sections.

d. The exact organization and disposition of CSS elements is a function of the AATF's mission and anticipated follow-on operations. Normally, two options for organizing and positioning CSS elements prevail:

(1) If the AATF anticipates being extracted from the objective area following mission completion, unit trains and supporting CSS elements are not normally displaced forward but remain in the brigade support area (BSA) or other rear area.

(2) If the AATF is to remain in the air assault objective area to link up with other forces, or to conduct extensive follow-on operations, CSS elements would initially be provided by moving FSSEs and combat trains forward when the enemy situation permits.

6-4. Air assault task force trains.

a. The trains for all AATF elements must be organized, located, and controlled so as to facilitate the consolidation, packaging, and air movement of support packages configured to unit size (normally company or platoon).

b. The organization of trains varies with the mission assigned the AATF and the CS and CSS available. Trains may be centralized in one location (unit trains), or they may be echeloned in two or more locations (echeloned trains). It is normally appropriate to centralize all AATF logistical assets at one location as unit trains under the control of the AATF S4. This provides ease of coordination, control, and security of logistical assets, and allows for the most efficient use of logistical support helicopters.

c. Echeloned trains are normally only used when operations extend over vast distances such as might be expected in the delay or during an economy-of-force or security mission. The AATFC would normally elect to echelon his trains when he feels that CSS must be collocated with maneuver units to provide immediate, dedicated support.

d. The AATF commander normally moves only essential support elements to the objective area.

6-5. Command, control, and communications (C3).

a. The AATF SI and S4, under the direction of the AATF executive officer (XO), operate the administrative and logistics center and have overall responsibility for CSS command and control.

b. Timely and effective CSS depends on a good communications system. At AATF level, CSS communication may be by radio, courier, or radio teletypewriter (RATT). The AATF administrative and logistics center radio net is used for most administrative and logistic traffic. For lengthy administrative and logistical reports, messenger or RATT should be used. "As of" and "due" times for reports at all levels should take this into consideration, allowing more time for long reports to be delivered by messenger.

c. The administrative and logistics center is the net control station (NCS) for the administrative and logistics net. The S4, SI, headquarters company commander, maintenance officer, support platoon leader, medical platoon leader, company first sergeants, and others as required, operate in the administrative and logistics net.

d. When FM radio communication over the AATF administrative and logistics net is not possible, due to the distance between stations, hard copy messages are sent with resupply or evacuation aircraft.

6-6. Helicopter external load operations.

a. Transporting supplies and equipment by helicopter external (sling) load has the advantage of rapidly moving heavy, outsized, or urgently needed items directly to the using unit. The logistical planner can enhance the sustainment of the AATF by planning well in advance for slingload operations and by understanding the limitations imposed by external load operations.

b. External load limitations to be considered:

(1) If a cargo is too light or bulky, it will not "fly" properly when suspended under the aircraft at cruise airspeeds.

(2) The external load must not exceed a helicopter's lift (under given atmospheric conditions) or hook capabilities (8,000 pounds for the UH-60).

(3) Airspeeds must be slower when helicopters carry external loads.

(4) Dust, sand, or snow, which would be blown during hover for pickup or delivery of cargo, may preclude safe external load operations.

(5) The higher altitudes, which must be flown with slingloads, may subject the aircraft to more ground fire.

(6) Extended hovering to pick up or deliver a slingload during darkness is inherently more dangerous than similar daylight operations.

(7) The availability of suitable slings, cargo nets, cargo bags, and other air delivery items may preclude or limit external load operations.

c. There are normally three different elements involved in a slingload mission: the supported unit, the aviation unit, and the receiving unit. The responsibilities and functions of each are:

(1) The supported unit (normally the AATF S4) is responsible for:

(a) Selecting, preparing, and controlling the PZ.

(b) Requisitioning all the equipment needed for slingload operations, including slings, A-22 bags, cargo nets, and containers.

(c) Storing, inspecting, and maintaining all slingload equipment.

(d) Providing a sufficient number of trained ground crews for rigging and inspecting all the loads, guiding the helicopters, hooking up the loads, and clearing the aircraft for departure.

(e) Securing and protecting sensitive items of supply and equipment.

(f) Providing load derigging and disposition instructions to the receiving unit.

(g) Providing disposition instructions to the receiving and aviation units for the slings, A-22 bags, cargo nets, and containers.

(2) The aviation unit is responsible for-.

(a) Effecting and/or establishing coordination with the supported and receiving units.

(b) Advising the supported unit on the limitations of the size and weight of the loads that may be rigged.

(c) Advising the supported and receiving units on the suitability of the selected PZs and/or LZs.

(d) Providing assistance for the recovery and return to the PZ of the slings, A-22 bags, cargo nets, and containers as required by the supported unit.

(e) Establishing safety procedures that will ensure uniformity and understanding of duties and responsibilities between the ground crew and flight crew.

(3) The receiving unit is responsible for:

(a) Selecting, preparing, and controlling the LZ.

(b) Having trained ground crews available to guide the aircraft in and derig the load.

(c) Coordinating with the supported (sending) unit for the control and return of the slings, A-22 bags, or any other items that belong to the supported unit, and returning them as soon as possible.

(d) Preparing, coordinating, and inspecting backloads, such as slings, A-22 bags, and so forth, and having them ready for hookup or loading.

d. See FM 55-450-1 for additional information on these procedures.